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ABSTRACT
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the fed-
eral government of the United States distributed 270 million acres of
land to homesteaders. The federal land-grant legislation allowed sin-
gle women, but not married women, to partake in homesteading. Ex-
isting in a “legal netherworld” between single and married, deserted
wives did not have clear rights under the federal legislation, much like
deserted wives did not have clear rights in American marital law.
During the homesteading period, many deserted wives litigated
claims in front of the Department of the Interior, arguing they had the
right to homestead. This is the first article to collect and analyze the
administrative decisions regarding the homesteading rights of de-
serted wives, offering a unique view of American marriage. After docu-
menting the history of homesteading rights of deserted wives, this
Article explores how these unique administrative decisions adopted or
rejected the prevailing marital norms in America and how under-
standing these administrative decisions can aid in our understanding
of marriage in American history.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Women played a critical role in homesteading the American West.
The women profiled in this Article settled homesteads alongside their
husbands or moved onto their husbands’ homesteads after marriage.
Once a husband and wife were residing on the homestead, the hus-
band might leave, sometimes permanently and sometimes for a num-
ber of years. Husbands left for various reasons: some left to pursue
other economic activities;1 others were imprisoned2 or fled for fear of
imprisonment;3 and one dramatically left the state, leaving no sign of
his destination, after being “charged with the crime of larceny, [and]
shot by the sheriff.”4 In each of the cases profiled, the deserted wife5
1. Gates, 7 Pub. Lands Dec. 35 (1888).
2. Sugden, 22 Pub. Lands Dec. 356, 357 (1896).
3. Kamanski, 9 Pub. Lands Dec. 186, 187 (1889).
4. Crosby, 21 Pub. Lands Dec. 152, 153 (1895).
5. In this Article, I choose to describe women who were married but had been de-
serted by their husbands as “deserted wives.” This rhetorical decision was made
in spite of fears that referring to these women as “wives” leaves the impression
that their only identity is wrapped up in marital status. However, this language
is the most precise and provides the best descriptor for these women. During this
time period, the term “deserted wife” was a semi-legal term, although close to a
legal fiction because some women may have been characterized as a deserted wife
regardless of their personal circumstances. The deserted wives in this Article
held a special status under the law precisely because they were married. Their
rights must be distinguished from married but un-abandoned women and single
women. Additionally, this language is consistent with terminology used in the
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was left on her husband’s homestead, a piece of government-owned
land to which the wife had no direct legal claim. Thus, a vexing prob-
lem arose for the Land Department: Should the wife deserted by her
husband—but still residing on his homestead—be able to make a
claim to that homestead?6 Although the federal laws were first inter-
preted to bar homestead claims by deserted wives, a special exception
developed that allowed a deserted wife to claim rights to the marital
homestead and ultimately come to own the homestead in fee simple in
her own name.
The deserting husbands and deserted wives profiled in this Article
are, in many ways, emblematic of American mobility during the years
of westward expansion. Husbands, wives, and children moved west
across an expanding America.7 But families also dissolved with a
higher frequency once on the American Frontier.8 Some desertions
were purposeful—men might move to escape an unhappy marriage.9
Some desertions were not purposeful—men might move intending to
return but simply never did.10 In all, the “restlessness of American
life” and the movement of individuals and families west as new home-
steading areas were opened contributed to marital desertions during
the homesteading period.11
Yet, even though marital desertions were more common in the
homesteading West, I argue those desertions were not as troubling in
the homesteading context. A deserted wife could actually have better
reviewed administrative decisions. See, e.g., Herwig, 28 Pub. Lands Dec. 482, 482
(1899) (using language of “deserted wife” to define a particular group of women
with certain rights). It is also worth noting that there was no equivalent “de-
serted husband” in this context because if a wife did desert the land stayed under
the name of the husband.
6. See James Muhn, Women and the Homestead Act: Land Department Administra-
tion of a Legal Imbroglio, 1863–1934, 7 W. LEGAL HIST. 283, 301 (1994) (posing
the same question).
7. HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 20 (2000) (“Families
mov[ed] together across the great American wilderness.”).
8. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 144–45 (3d ed. 2005)
(“More marriages seemed to be cracking under the strains of nineteenth-century
life. This increased the demand for divorce—or for legal separation. . . . [I]n the
restless, mobile society of nineteenth-century America, absconding husbands
were far from rare.”).
9. HARTOG, supra note 7.
10. See id.; see also LILIAN BRANDT, FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FOUR DESERTERS
AND THEIR FAMILIES: A DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF THEIR CHARACTERISTICS AND CIR-
CUMSTANCES 42 (1905) (finding that wanderlust was not a common reason for
desertion; in fact, of the 574 subjects studied, “there were only five men who had
‘always roamed over the country’ or ‘never been satisfied anywhere long at a
time’”).
11. See BRANDT, supra note 10, at 7, 36 (“Only seventeen [of the 574 men in the
study] left in discouragement about work or with the avowed purpose of looking
for work and one of these had given up his job voluntarily to go to Alaska at the
time of the Klondyke [sic] excitement.”).
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support (because she could become a landowner) than if her husband
had not deserted her (and only her husband became the landowner).
This observation is particularly important because—looking at the le-
gal mechanism of coverture that still governed marital relationships—
one would predict that a deserted wife would have no legal claim to
the property. However, the patriarchal logic of coverture reasoned
that women needed support, and in the case of a deserted wife it was
clear a husband was failing to provide that support. Thus, following
the support rationale for coverture, the government—through the
homesteading laws—had the rare opportunity to provide women prop-
erty so they could support themselves. Coverture and support can only
partly explain the outcomes of the cases I analyze. I also argue that
unwritten assumptions about the roles of husbands and wives gov-
erned the homesteading rights of deserted wives, even when the fed-
eral statutes did not clearly—or actually—support those outcomes.
In this Article I focus only on deserted wives: women who were
legally married but whose husbands had abandoned them. This Arti-
cle primarily describes the legal rights of deserted wives under the
homesteading regime—a topic that has not been discussed in legal
scholarship and has barely been discussed in history scholarship, in-
cluding the study of memoirs and letters by literary historians.12 Im-
portantly, this Article also informs understandings of the meaning of
marriage and what it meant to be a wife or husband during the settle-
ment of America. In doing so, it contributes to a rich area of scholar-
ship about marriage in early America. Much like the work of legal
historian Hendrik Hartog, this Article turns to marital separations to
make sense of marriage.13 In particular, this Article makes two new
12. These cases have never been cited in a work of legal scholarship. I found only two
secondary sources that discussed any cases about deserted wives. One work that
collected and analyzed some of these cases (but not all of these cases) is by James
Muhn. Muhn, supra note 6. Muhn, writing more generally about the rights of
female homesteaders, devotes seven pages of his article to the discussion of de-
serted wives. Id. at 301–07. This analysis provides an important starting point
for understanding the rights of deserted wives but does not provide a complete
picture of the legal meaning of the changes in rights over time. In fact, Muhn
skips over the critical time period of precedential development between Bray, 2
Pub. Lands Dec. 78 (1884), and the 1914 Act that provided additional rights to
deserted wives, Act of Oct. 22, 1914, ch. 335, 38 Stat. 766. See Muhn, supra note
6, at 305. The second work I found that discusses deserted wives using cases is an
1893 treatise. RUFUS WAPLES, A TREATISE ON HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTION 927
(Chicago, T.H. Flood & Co. 1893). Under the heading “Married applicants,”
Waples dedicated a single paragraph to deserted wives. Id. But most of the cases
Waples cited are not about deserted wives; they are cases with general state-
ments of laws that were applicable to deserted wives as well as other
homesteaders.
13. Hendrik Hartog uses marital separations to “make sense of marriage in Ameri-
can law during the generations prior to our own” and to come to “a historical
understanding of core legal concepts: of wife, of husband, of unity.” HARTOG,
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contributions. This Article is the first to collect and analyze the ad-
ministrative decisions on the legal status of deserted wives attempting
to exercise the right to homestead. The existing sources generally fail
to acknowledge the important role that the law played in the way that
homesteaders—both men and women—conducted themselves.14
In addition, this Article builds on the important work of legal his-
torians about marital separation in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Legal historians, most notably Hendrik Hartog,
have recognized the importance of the law and social roles of sepa-
rated spouses in understanding historical family law.15 No one, how-
ever, has ever studied separated spouses in the context of the
homesteading of America.16 Studying this particular type of marital
separation is important because the law of marriage needed to work
differently in the settlement of the American West. Specifically, the
law of marriage needed to prop up a system of land settlement, which,
as I demonstrate, meant that sometimes women were given more
property and land rights than otherwise expected. Through collecting
and analyzing these administrative cases for the first time, this Arti-
cle also builds on and provides additional support for work by other
legal historians. For example, my analysis complements Laurel
Thatcher Ulrich’s discussion of Colonial women as “deputy hus-
bands,”17 Ariela Dubler’s study of unmarried women and their rela-
tionship to the State,18 and Reva Siegel’s studies of women’s
earnings.19
supra note 7, at 1. Today, one can look to divorce to understand marriage, but in
early America, divorces were difficult or impossible to obtain. See FRIEDMAN,
supra note 8, at 141–45.
14. But see H. ELAINE LINDGREN, LAND IN HER OWN NAME: WOMEN AS HOMESTEADERS
IN NORTH DAKOTA 57–81 (1991) (discussing how the law impacted female home-
steaders in North Dakota).
15. HARTOG, supra note 7; see also MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROP-
ERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 58–80 (1986) (analyzing divorce and separation in
America from 1750 until 1830).
16. In his main work on the marital relationship, Hartog mentions federal land pol-
icy once. HARTOG, supra note 7, at 261 (discussing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190
(1888)). One commentator described Hartog’s take on marital policy as “dis-
miss[ing] federal interest in marriage as public policy.” Beverly J. Schwartzberg,
Untangling Marriage’s Hidden History: Two Views, 11 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 281,
294 (2001) (reviewing NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND
THE NATION (2000)); HARTOG, supra note 7. Nancy Cott, in her important work on
the history of American marriage, fails to mention public land policy except in a
discussion of Indian land. COTT, supra, at 123 (discussing the Dawes Act and the
federal policy of forcing monogamy on Native Americans).
17. LAUREL THATCHER ULRICH, GOOD WIVES: IMAGE AND REALITY IN THE LIVES OF WO-
MEN IN NORTHERN NEW ENGLAND 1650–1750, at 35–50 (1982).
18. Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Con-
struction of the Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641 (2003).
19. Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning
Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994) [hereinafter
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This Article lays out the history and analysis of the homesteading
rights of deserted wives in five Parts. Part II examines the structure
of the various homesteading laws and addresses women’s legal rights
to homestead. Congress drafted the homestead laws in an attempt to
settle the American West with American citizens and American fami-
lies.20 But not every adult American citizen was able to homestead—
the homesteading laws only allowed women to homestead in limited
circumstances. Accordingly, Part II also examines the status of de-
serted wives in American law during the homesteading period. Under-
standing the role and status of deserted wives in the broader
American context helps to set apart the status of deserted wives under
the homesteading laws. Part III discusses this Article’s methodology
and also notes the limited nature of this topic. Part IV provides a gen-
eral overview of the historical changes in the homesteading rights of
deserted wives. Notably, Part IV covers federal law—congressional ac-
tions and key decisions from the Secretary of the Department of the
Interior. Although states were, and still are, the main regulators of
the family, the homesteading rights of deserted wives were governed
by federal law, with state law operating only at the margins.
Part V provides more details about the homesteading rights of de-
serted wives, focusing on three highly litigated issues: the determina-
tion of marital residence, how and when women could establish
homestead residency separate from their husbands, and the time re-
straints on alleging desertion. Because Part V focuses on the trends
and changes in administrative jurisprudence, it also includes a rich
factual description of numerous cases. Although the stories told
through the cases are compelling, it is worth remembering that hus-
bands and wives likely framed their stories to craft legally compelling
narratives.21 Yet the decisions and their factual background provide
substantial insight into the trajectory of women’s property and mari-
tal rights during the homesteading period.
Finally, Part VI analyzes the special status of deserted wives
under the homesteading laws and compares deserted wives claiming
homestead rights to deserted wives in broader American law. In Part
VI, I make several important arguments about women’s rights and the
Siegel, Home as Work]; Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law:
Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 1860–1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127 (1994)
[hereinafter Siegel, Marital Status Law].
20. See WAPLES, supra note 12, at 928 (noting the “qualification of citizenship, or of
application therefor,” was required and that “[w]hen a foreigner has made home-
stead entry, it must be cancelled for illegality if he did not declare his intention of
becoming naturalized prior to the entry”).
21. Schwartzberg, supra note 16, at 292 (noting that when spouses litigated against
each other “the narratives created by wives and husbands [were] less unmediated
truths than performances couched in terms that lawyers, judges, and communi-
ties might recognize and reward”).
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marital relationship during the homesteading period. Part VI also ex-
amines three trends that appear in the homesteading context and also
in other litigation about marriage and separation: the role of fault, the
government’s interest in privatizing dependency, and the protection of
the marital relationship. I examine these trends in depth for their rel-
evance to the homesteading rights of deserted wives, and I also con-
textualize them with the law of marriage and separation in the rest of
America during the same timeframe. Although the law of homestead-
ing was distinctly different than normal marital laws in some ways,
deserted wives were not treated substantially different in the home-
steading context compared to other legal contexts. In other words, un-
written assumptions about the roles of husbands and wives governed
the homesteading rights of deserted wives even when there was no
federal statutory basis to do so.
II. THE LEGAL ABILITY OF DESERTED WIVES TO
HOMESTEAD
Although women’s property rights were long governed by the com-
mon law, federal and state legislation began to tweak those rights in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.22 For the purposes
of this Article, the relevant statutory scheme is the various federal
laws governing land grants from the federal government to individual
citizens. The common law, of course, continued to operate in the back-
ground of the drafting, meaning, and application of these laws.
Throughout this Article, I collectively refer to the numerous laws gov-
erning homesteading in America as the “homesteading laws,”23 but I
do note where material differences existed between the various stat-
utes. A full account of the laws and regulations governing the distribu-
tion of public lands through homesteading is beyond the scope of this
Article.24 Still, understanding the basic structure of the American
homesteading system is a critical first step to understanding the im-
22. See generally Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 19 (discussing women’s claims to
the output of household labor); Siegel, Marital Status Law, supra note 19 (dis-
cussing women’s rights to their own earnings).
23. “Homestead” has two distinct legal meanings relevant to the time period at issue.
This Article is about grants of public land to citizens in exchange for their settle-
ment in new territories. Homestead can also refer to a set of state laws that pro-
tect the real property on which a family resides from various outside
interventions. Thomas E. Simmons, Homestead: A (New) Hope, 63 S.D. L. REV.
75, 81 (2018). These homestead laws, although with roots in the mid-nineteenth
century, continue to protect homesteads (the primary residence type) today. See
Thomas E. Simmons, Prequel to Homestead, 62 S.D. L. REV. 332, 345–70 (2017)
(overviewing contemporary protections for homesteads).
24. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 168 (“The disposition of the public domain is a
story of staggering detail.”).
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portance of why and how deserted wives exercised their homestead
rights.25
The Homestead Act of 1862 was the primary law operating during
the settlement of the American West and, in many ways, it provided
the basis for the other homestead laws.26 Importantly, the Act did not
completely prohibit women from filing on homesteads.27 The Home-
stead Act of 1862 gave homesteading eligibility to “any person who is
the head of a family, or who has arrived at the age of twenty-one
years.”28 “Any person” included women; in fact, the remainder of the
statute used the language of “his or her” to discuss the rights and obli-
gations of homesteaders.29 As such, there was immediate recognition
that single women—including widows, divorced women, and never-
25. The majority of the cases about deserted wives come from two pieces of land-
grant legislation: the Preemption Act of 1841 and the Homestead Act of 1862. The
Preemption Act formalized the rights of settlers who squatted on land without a
previous purchase. Preemption Act of 1841, ch. 16, 5 Stat. 453 (repealed 1891);
see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 169–70 (discussing history leading up to the
Preemption Act of 1841 and how the law allowed “squatters” rights to purchase
land on which they already lived); Lee Ann Potter & Wynell Schamel, The Home-
stead Act of 1862, 61 SOC. EDUC. 359, 360 (1997) (“Prior to the war with Mexico
(1846–1848), people settling in the West demanded ‘pre-emption’—an individ-
ual’s right to settle land first and pay later.”). Under the Preemption Act, “[t]he
head of a family who had settled ‘in person’ on land and ‘improved’ it had first
choice or claim to buy the land, up to 160 acres, at the minimum government
price.” FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 170. The Preemption Act was ultimately
merged into the later homesteading laws, and the judicial and administrative
interpretations of either act governed both. Charles R. Pierce, The Land Depart-
ment as an Administrative Tribunal, 10 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 271, 272 (1916).
26. Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 175) (repealed
1976). With few exceptions, the other homestead laws followed the same general
requirements for, and limitations on, women homesteaders as the Homestead Act
of 1862.
27. Id. at 392; see also MONTANA WOMEN HOMESTEADERS: A FIELD OF ONE’S OWN 19
(Sarah Carter ed., 2009) (stating that the Homestead Act of 1862 had “gender-
neutral wording”).
28. 12 Stat. at 392. The law also required that a homesteader be a citizen of the
United States or have filed a declaration to become a citizen and barred from
homesteading any individual who had ever “borne arms against the United
States Government or given aid and comfort to its enemies.” Id.
29. Id. The Homestead Act of 1862 required that an application be “made for his or
her exclusive use and benefit” and described separately what happened to a
homestead “if he be dead” or “in case of her death.” Id. The same subsection of the
statute, however, does use “he” to discuss the bar on homesteaders who had borne
arms against the United States. Id. Congress was concerned about granting land
to Confederate Civil War soldiers who were all officially men, although in actual-
ity some women fought on both sides in the Civil War. See generally DEANNE
BLANTON & LAUREN M. COOK, THEY FOUGHT LIKE DEMONS: WOMEN SOLDIERS IN
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (2002) (describing roles, histories, and disguise strate-
gies of female soldiers in the American Civil War).
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married women—were qualified to homestead.30 Although the Home-
stead Act of 1862 clearly allowed some women to homestead, the De-
partment of the Interior interpreted the act to exclude married women
because of the role of coverture in determining the legal rights of wo-
men.31 In 1864, the Land Department reasoned that a married wo-
man was qualified neither as “any person” nor as a “head of a family”
because “a married wom[a]n has no legal existence.”32 This lack of le-
gal existence came from coverture, which held that a woman’s legal
identity merged into that of her husband at the time of marriage. Ac-
cordingly, a married woman did not have a separate legal identity
during the duration of her marriage.33 Without a legal existence of her
own, a married woman could not homestead—nor gain rights in her
own name—because those rights would necessarily belong to her hus-
band, and her husband could not homestead more than once.34 A mar-
ried woman was also unable to homestead under the “head of a
family” provision because a woman’s husband was necessarily the
“head of a family” and therefore the qualified homesteader.35 Around
90% of homesteaders were men; however, the official records do not
make clear the number of single men versus married men.36 Before
1900, fewer than 10% of all entries were made by women, but the per-
centage of female homesteaders increased over time.37
The homestead laws imposed a general three-step process for
homesteaders to become landowners and receive fee simple title to
land.38 The first step was for a qualified homesteader to “make entry”
30. Muhn, supra note 6, at 285 (“The ability of unmarried women to make entry
under the Homestead Act did not, in itself, pose any particular dilemma to the
Land Department.”).
31. Id. at 285, 287.
32. Id. (quoting James H. Edmunds, Comm’r of the General Land Office).
33. COTT, supra note 16, at 11–12.
34. Muhn, supra note 6, at 287; WAPLES, supra note 12, at 927 (“[T]wo homesteads
cannot be taken by a married couple . . . .”).
35. Muhn, supra note 6, at 287.
36. Id. at 283–84.
37. Id.; Elizabeth Jameson, Foreword to LINDGREN, supra note 14, at v, vii (“More
women, proportionately, homesteaded after 1900 than before.”); see also Nat’l
Park Serv., The Homestead Act of 1862, MUSEUM GAZETTE, Aug. 2000, at 1, 2,
https://www.nps.gov/jeff/learn/historyculture/upload/homestead.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/SZ24-D4GC] (“Single women were eligible to claim homesteads,
and many did. Depending on time and place, approximately five to twenty per
cent of homesteaders were women.”).
38. See Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392, 392–93 (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§ 175) (repealed 1976) (listing requirements of homesteaders applying for entry).
Like many things in unsettled America, it took a while for the federal govern-
ment and its officers to get control over the land-grant system. For a discussion of
vigilantism used to protect land claims around Omaha, Nebraska, see Sean M.
Kammer, Public Opinion Is More than Law: Popular Sovereignty and Vigilantism
in the Nebraska Territory, 31 GREAT PLAINS Q. 309 (2011).
428 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:419
or “file” on a piece of land.39 The filing of an application for entry
vested jurisdiction over the application in the Land Department of the
federal government.40 The individuals who filed for homesteads were
called “entrymen”—a widely used generic term that I adopt in this
Article to refer to both male and female homesteaders. Once a settler
became an entryman, he or she became the equitable owner of the
homestead and, although the federal government retained title, was
entitled to exclusive possession.41 In the second step of the home-
steading process, an entryman had to reside on and improve the
homestead for at least five years (later reduced to three years).42 At
the third step—after the homesteader had filed on a piece of land and
met the requirements of improvement and residency—the home-
steader could apply for title without paying any money for the land.43
39. 12 Stat. at 392–93.
40. Pierce, supra note 25, at 281. The application was also “known as a selection, a
sworn statement, a declaration, or a proffer.” Id. Once a homesteader filed the
required affidavit about qualifications and paid ten dollars, the local land office
approved or denied the entry. Id. If approved, “he or she [would] thereupon be
permitted to enter the quantity of land specified.” 12 Stat. at 392. Settlers often
entered land even prior to the General Land Office surveying the land and open-
ing a land office.
41. Pierce, supra note 25, at 282. The homesteader was treated by the state or terri-
tory as the real owner of the land who had the right to sell the land but also an
obligation to pay taxes. Id. As an equitable owner during the proving-up period,
the entryman’s right to the land remained under the jurisdiction of the Depart-
ment of the Interior, and the federal government continued to hold title. Id.
42. See 12 Stat. at 392 (“[N]o certificate shall be given or patent issued therefor until
the expiration of five years from the date of such entry.”). The Homestead Act of
1912 decreased the proving-up period to three years and allowed homesteaders to
meet residency requirements while being absent from the homestead for five
months a year. Homestead Act of 1912, ch. 153, 37 Stat. 123, 123 (repealed 1976).
Improving a homestead required an entryman to reside on the land, cultivate the
land, and build a habitable home. 12 Stat. at 392; Potter & Schamel, supra note
25, at 359. An 1881 case provides just one example of what a homesteader put
forth for proof of improvements. Mary Mahoney alleged the following had been
done on her Kansas homestead: “[S]he and her children had a comfortable house
fourteen by twenty-eight feet upon said tract, also had a stable, a well and corral
and had about forty-five acres of said land in cultivation.” Thrasher, 8 Pub. Lands
Dec. 626, 627 (1889). If a homesteader did not intend to permanently inhabit the
land, he or she could be denied entry or title; residency credit would not be given
to someone not intending to stay permanently. The good faith requirement ap-
plied during the proving-up period. “A settler who [went] upon public land with
the intention of remaining just long enough to secure title by colorable compli-
ance with the law” was not in compliance with the residency requirements of the
homestead laws. Spalding, 8 Pub. Lands Dec. 615, 618 (1889) (citing Van Ostrum,
6 Pub. Lands Dec. 25 (1887)).
43. 12 Stat. at 392. Once becoming qualified to apply for title—by building a habita-
ble home, residing on the homestead, and cultivating the homestead—the home-
steader applied for title by having two neighbors vouch for the truth of his or her
statements that the requirements had been met. Id. The local land offices col-
lected the documentation for homesteaders who filed and proved up. Id. at 393.
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Applying for title was termed “proving up” or “applying for patent” to
the land.44 This entire process was subject to a good faith
requirement.45
III. LIMITATIONS AND METHODOLOGY
The scope of this Article is limited in two particular ways. First, I
only analyze a single category of homesteaders—married women
abandoned by their husbands while residing on a homestead during
the proving-up period. There is much to be said about all solo female
homesteaders—whether never-married, divorced, or widowed—but
those women are outside the scope of this Article because their legal
status was very different than the legal status of deserted wives. Sin-
gle women were given the right to homestead in the text of the Home-
stead Act, and, although those single female homesteaders faced
interesting legal and practical hurdles, their paths to becoming land-
owners through the homestead laws were fundamentally different
than the paths available to deserted wives. The special status of de-
serted wives deserves to be studied separately—as I do here—because
desertion is unique from other marital statuses. Ultimately, the status
of deserted wives demonstrates something unique about the ways in
Those documents were sent to the General Land Office, located in Washington,
D.C., and eventually a patent would be issued from the federal government. Pot-
ter & Schamel, supra note 25, at 360. Once a patent was issued, the administra-
tive powers of the Department of the Interior ceased. United States v. Schurz,
102 U.S. 378, 378 (1880).
44. As an alternative to proving up after five years of residence, homesteaders could
take advantage of the commutation clause, which allowed an entryman to live on
the land for six months and then buy the land. 12 Stat. at 393. The cost was $1.25
an acre. The commutation clause allowed settlers to cut short the homesteading
period and also incentivized those with no intention of permanently farming or
ranching the land to file on a homestead, purchase the land under the commuta-
tion clause, and immediately sell to neighbors or investors. FRIEDMAN, supra note
8, at 146. No cases profiled in this Article arose under the commutation clause.
45. In light of the federal government’s liberal land-grant policies, fraud was a major
concern. Perhaps the highest concern for fraud came with commutation clause
purchase because the homestead could immediately be alienated. But, other
forms of fraud were also of concern to the government. See Pierce, supra note 25,
at 273. The good faith requirement required homesteaders to aver they were
making entry with the intent to permanently reside on the land. WAPLES, supra
note 12, at 932 (explaining that an entryman had to swear under oath his or her
intent to actually settle the land). Lack of good faith was a valid reason to deny
patent to an entryman. In the 1889 case of Edward C. Ballew, 8 Pub. Lands Dec.
508, 508 (1889), the local commissioner found a homesteader lacked the neces-
sary good faith to receive patent because he intended to remove his family from
the land after receiving patent. The Department of the Interior reversed this
holding, not on an error of law, but because the entryman had good faith intent to
maintain his residence on the land at the time of entry and only intervening
changes (e.g., the entryman getting a job which required him to live off the home-
stead) altered his intentions. Id. at 509.
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which married women’s property rights worked in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.
This Article’s focused analysis of the homestead rights of deserted
wives also means that I do not address the property rights of Native
American women. The history of homesteading is nothing if not a part
of the history of conquest and the appropriation of Native American
land. First, Native Americans were excluded from homesteading.46
Further, at the same time that the federal government was granting
agricultural land to white women and requiring that they cultivate
that land, the federal government was trying to restructure the soci-
ety of various Native American tribes to prevent women from doing
agricultural work.47 That history is important but is not included in
this Article because of the narrow scope of the laws and decisions that
I study.
Second, I analyze only administrative decisions about deserted
wives and their legal right to homestead under the federal homestead
laws. Although I do not profile any state court decisions, the Article is
largely about how homesteading laws related to other laws of mar-
riage. In Part VI, I discuss these relationships in detail. The legal
rules governing marriage interacted with homesteading rights in vari-
ous ways including, for example, through bigamy prohibitions, prop-
erty allocation through married women’s property rights, the role of
fault in marital breakdown, husbands’ support obligations, and even
marital privacy.48 The interaction with state marriage laws is critical
to understanding the uniqueness of federal homesteading laws, but
this Article also suggests that future research should focus on state
court decisions about property ownership after a single person or mar-
ried couple received patent.49
Instead of trying to encompass state law cases or cases about any-
one except white female homesteaders abandoned by their husbands,
this Article narrowly focuses on federal administrative decisions about
deserted wives who attempted to take over a homestead claim from a
deserting husband. The studied cases can be generally categorized
into two groups. The first type of case arose where a wife made a di-
rect claim on the homestead. In other words, her husband had de-
serted and she decided to seek to homestead in her own name. The
46. Although the language of the Homestead Act did not specifically prohibit entry by
Native Americans, the Act required homesteaders be citizens, and Native Ameri-
cans were not granted citizenship until 1924. Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, ch.
233, 43 Stat. 253.
47. For a case study of Native American women and agricultural work, see Joan M.
Jensen, Native American Women and Agriculture: A Seneca Case Study, 3 SEX
ROLES 423 (1977).
48. See infra Part VI.
49. Some work has been done on this topic, including Alvin E. Evans, Community
Property in Public Lands, 9 CALIF. L. REV. 267 (1921).
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deserted wives in this first type of case sought entry on the homestead
and/or proved up the homestead. These cases pitted a wife in direct
litigation against her husband because it was her homesteading claim
against his homesteading claim. Like other litigation between spouses
during this time period, the administrative records show women “air-
ing their grievances” about their husbands’ actions or inactions.50
The second type of case arose when a third party sought to make a
claim on the homestead, and the deserted wife contested that third-
party claim. These claims arose because when a homesteader aban-
doned the homestead, it reverted to the government and the entryman
lost all rights to the land.51 Once that happened, a new entryman
could claim the homestead. Accordingly, cases arose where a third
party who wanted to make entry and a deserted wife already living on
the land disputed who should be able to make entry on the abandoned
homestead. These cases—where a deserted wife was litigating against
a third party—only involved making entry on the homestead; none of
them were about the right to prove up after the three- to five-year
residency period. To complicate this second type of case further, Con-
gress, in an attempt to combat fraud, allowed other citizens to chal-
lenge the good faith and qualifications of homesteaders.52 As an
incentive, Congress allowed a challenger who filed a “contest” to re-
ceive the right to make entry as a reward for securing the cancellation
of the fraudulent homesteader’s entry.53 Accordingly, a would-be en-
tryman might allege that a husband had abandoned the homestead
because making that allegation would give the challenger a protected
right to make entry. Although eventually the Department of the Inte-
rior disallowed this practice when a deserted wife was left behind, sev-
eral early cases arose under this situation.
Both types of cases went through the same administrative process.
This process was, in many ways, born out of the government’s concern
with controlling fraud.54 The implementation of the homestead laws,
including the issuance of regulations and the adjudications of chal-
50. See Jaunita John, Note, Wives’ Lawsuits Addressing Husband Drunkenness:
Tempered by Gender Standards, 1850–1910, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 141, 149
(2015) (noting that in litigation between wives and drunkard husbands “one can
find proof in court dockets of women airing their grievances regarding male
drunkenness”).
51. WAPLES, supra note 12, at 934 (explaining that the entryman “forfeit[ed] all his
present and prospective rights”).
52. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095, 1096 (amending law provid-
ing for the sale of deserted lands); Act of May 14, 1880, ch. 89, 21 Stat. 140, 141
(providing notification by register to persons who procured the cancellation of any
entry).
53. Pierce, supra note 25, at 283.
54. Without concerns of fraud, “the disposal of the public lands [could have been]
accomplished through officials and inspectors without the intermediary of hear-
ings and arguments.” Id. at 273. Fraud, however, was a concern—particularly
432 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:419
lenges, was governed by the Department of the Interior.55 The appeals
system of the Land Department was established to determine whether
homesteaders qualified under the governing statutes, including
whether they met statutory requirements and did so in good faith.56
Procedurally, contests went first to a local land office where local
land officers made an initial decision on whether a homesteader was
qualified to prove up under the relevant homestead law. The local
land officers making these decisions were registers or receivers, offi-
cial posts appointed by the President.57 Because registers and receiv-
ers were appointed by the President, they were replaced at each
change in presidential administration.58 The register was the man-
ager of an individual land office, and the receiver handled monetary
receipts along with other duties.59 A homesteader, or a challenger to a
homesteading claim, could then appeal to a commissioner of the Gen-
eral Land Office. After a commissioner issued a decision, the home-
steader or the challenger had a final appeal available to the Secretary
of the Department of the Interior.60 Although commissioners issued
most final decisions, those decisions were never published and are not
because of the great value of the land given away and the importance of that land
to individual settlers. Id.
55. Muhn, supra note 6, at 284; see also Pierce, supra note 25, at 276 (“[T]he secre-
tary of the interior is vested with full authority to prescribe regulations by which
the provisions of the law can be taken advantage of . . . .”). For a description of the
early administration of public lands, see PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, THE LEGACY
OF CONQUEST: THE UNBROKEN PAST OF THE AMERICAN WEST 59–62 (1987).
56. See Pierce, supra note 25, at 274–75 (listing three objectives of the Land Depart-
ment tribunals). The Land Department of the Department of the Interior was
“constituted [as] a special tribunal” to decide questions of settlement on public
lands, and “their decisions [we]re final to the same extent that those of other
judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals are.” Vance v. Burbank, 101 U.S. 514, 519
(1879) (discussing, specifically, the Land Department’s authority in contests
under the Donation Act). But see United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378 (1880)
(discussing limits on the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior).
57. CHAMP CLARK VAUGHAN, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES GENERAL LAND OF-
FICE IN OREGON 19 (2014), https://www.blm.gov/or/landsrealty/glo200/files/glo-
book.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/QWC3-TE7A].
58. Id. at 21.
59. Id. at 19.
60. See, e.g., Jennie P. Musser, 44 Pub. Lands Dec. 494 (1915) (describing procedur-
ally how claim was denied by local land officer, appealed to the Commissioner
(who denied the claim), and further appealed to the Secretary (who reversed)). A
Westlaw search indicates that the Department of the Interior issued 576 opinions
about the Homestead Act of 1862 before 1920. In addition to this appeal to the
Secretary, a losing party had thirty days to file for rehearing. Henry L. McClin-
tock, The Administrative Determination of Public Land Controversies, 9 MINN. L.
REV. 638, 642–43 (1924). For a time, a losing party at rehearing even had the
opportunity to apply for rereview after the initial rehearing. Id. at 642. The right
to apply for a second rehearing, however, was abolished. Id.
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included in this Article.61 Instead, I mainly draw on the published
opinions of the Secretary or an assistant secretary writing on behalf of
the Secretary.62 Throughout this Article, I refer to these final opinions
of the Department of the Interior as issued by the “Secretary,”
whether it was the Secretary or an assistant secretary writing on be-
half of the Secretary.63
Because the federal circuit courts were never given a right to judi-
cial review of the administrative decisions, very few court cases about
homesteading rights exist.64 State courts could review administrative
decisions but only on equitable grounds.65 State courts would also pro-
tect homesteaders’ possessory interests, including prosecuting for
61. Pierce, supra note 25, at 279 (“[I]n the vast bulk of the cases the commissioner’s
action and decision [were] final.”).
62. See generally Tyler, 12 Pub. Lands Dec. 94 (1891) (containing signature of “First
Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office”);
Porter, 5 Pub. Lands Dec. 42 (1886) (containing signature of “Secretary Lamar to
Commissioner Sparks”).
63. The Secretary was, of course, the head of the Department of the Interior. “The
secretary, however, d[id] not, except in a few selected cases involving matters of
great public policy, attempt actually to adjudicate appeals himself.” Pierce, supra
note 25, at 280. The Secretary generally delegated decision-making to the first
assistant secretary, but of course the bureaucracy was more complicated: “Under
the first assistant secretary [wa]s the solicitor of the department, the board of
appeals of the interior department, the first assistant attorney and a large num-
ber of assistant attorneys.” Id.
64. See McClintock, supra note 60, at 650 (“Congress has never provided for review
by the courts of the decisions of the Land Department, though there has been
some demand for such review, and that demand was supported at one time by
President Taft.” (footnote omitted)).
65. The Supreme Court described the jurisdiction over appeals from the Land De-
partment in this way:
3. The general proposition is recognized that when a special tribunal is
authorized to hear and determine certain matters arising in the course
of its duties, its decisions within the scope of its authority are conclusive.
4. Under this principle the action of the Land Department in issuing a
patent is conclusive in all courts and in all proceedings, where by the
rules of law the legal title must prevail.
5. But courts of equity, both in England and in this country, have always
had the power in certain classes of cases to inquire into and correct in-
justice and wrong, in both judicial and executive action, founded in
fraud, mistake, or other special ground of equity, when private rights are
invaded.
Johnson v. Towsley, 80 U.S. 72, 72 (1871); see also Corbett v. Wood, 21 N.W. 734,
735 (Minn. 1884) (“The adjudications of the officers of the land department of the
government are subject to review by the courts, and after the issuance of a patent
to one party, a hostile claimant may come into a court of equity and show that the
same has been fraudulently procured, and that in equity he is entitled to the
land.” (citation omitted)).
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trespass during the proving-up period.66 The Supreme Court occasion-
ally weighed in on legal questions, but nearly every decision impacting
homesteading rights came from the Department of the Interior. This
Article, drawing mostly on Secretary decisions, covers legal questions
about every step of the homesteading process until the final issuance
of patent. My analysis—much like the jurisdiction of the Secretary
and the Department of the Interior—ends once patent was issued to a
settler.67 This is not to say that the story always ended once patent
was issued. Jurisdiction over fraud or mistake could remain with the
federal government,68 and litigation about ownership and marital
property rights fell under state or territorial law.69 Post-patent issues
about the marital property and ownership might exist but are outside
the scope of this Article.
Before turning to the administrative rulings about deserted wives,
a review of the legal rights and status of deserted wives is necessary.
Because the homesteading laws allowed limited categories of women
to homestead, some women were able to homestead in their own
names. In fact, solo female homesteaders had substantial success in
homesteading.70 However, the Department of the Interior interpreted
the homestead laws to prohibit married women from homesteading.
As the Supreme Court explained in 1879: “The wife could not be a
settler. She got nothing except through her husband.”71 In reality,
66. See, e.g., Michaelis v. Michaelis, 44 N.W. 1149, 1150 (Minn. 1890) (“But in the
mean time [sic] the law will protect her in her possession and property, and re-
store it if forcibly taken from her, and will interfere to punish trespassers who
seek to turn her out of possession by force or violence.”).
67. See generally United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378 (1880) (holding the Secretary
was without jurisdiction to revoke a patent once issued).
68. See, e.g., Johnson, 80 U.S. at 91 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (“[T]he case is controlled
by the act of Congress which provides that the decision of the Commissioner of
the General Land Office shall be final unless an appeal is taken to the Secretary
of the Interior. In my judgment the decree of the commissioner is final if no ap-
peal is taken, and in case of appeal that the decision of the appellate tribunal
created by the act of Congress is equally final and conclusive, except in cases of
fraud or mistake not known at the time of the investigation by the land
department.”).
69. The granting of a patent passed legal title to the homestead and ended jurisdic-
tion of the Land Department. “[T]he patent is conclusive as to his ownership of
the land in all actions at law.” McClintock, supra note 60, at 652. Although legal
title was passed, a “court of equity c[ould] require the holder of the patent, as it
c[ould] the holder of any legal title, to convey it to another who has a better equi-
table right to the land or can declare the holder a trustee.” Id.
70. See generally Carter, supra note 27 (discussing solo female homesteaders in Mon-
tana); LINDGREN, supra note 14 (discussing solo female homesteaders in North
Dakota).
71. Vance v. Burbank, 101 U.S. 514, 521 (1879). This general legal understanding of
the rights in marriage was not unique to married homesteaders. As a general
matter, it was understood that “to the extent that wives and husbands bargained
and worked together toward cooperative ends—for example, wealth, children,
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married women homesteaded alongside husbands; however, those wo-
men never filed on land or proved up land in their own names. One
exception existed to the general bar on married women being able to
homestead: deserted wives. Unlike single women who were qualified
to homestead as individuals, deserted wives were qualified to home-
stead “in the statutory privilege accorded to the ‘head of a family.’”72
Understanding why deserted wives were given this statutory privi-
lege, and understanding the importance of this designation, requires
understanding the general standing of deserted wives in America dur-
ing the homesteading period.
This Article builds on and adds to the analysis done by Hendrik
Hartog in Man and Wife in America: A History.73 Hartog analyzed the
meaning and status of separation in early American family law.
Hartog’s analysis covers marital relationships and separations from
early settlement until after World War II, but this Article covers the
shorter homesteading period from 1862-1935.74 And, unlike Hartog, I
survival, happiness—they did so in the context of an unequal and coercive insti-
tution, one in which women were systematically deprived of rights that men
gained.” HARTOG, supra note 7, at 167.
72. Porter, 5 Pub. Lands Dec. 42, 42 (1886); see also Pawley, 15 Pub. Lands Dec. 596,
596 (1892) (“A married woman, who is actually deserted by her husband, is enti-
tled, as the head of a family, to make homestead entry . . . .”); WAPLES, supra note
12, at 927 (“A deserted wife is treated as the head of her family when she is in
possession of land entered by her husband.”). This rule applied to the homestead-
ing laws in general, such as the Homestead Act of 1862, including its later
amendments and modifications, and other land-grant statutes. See Pawley, 15
Pub. Lands Dec. at 598 (“[I]f it is shown by competent testimony that the wife
was actually deserted and left to take care of herself, then she is competent, as
the head of a family, to make the entry in question regardless of time that inter-
venes before it is made.”); Glaze, 2 Pub. Lands Dec. 311, 313 (1884) (holding in-
tact deserted wife’s entry under the Timber Culture Act of 1862); cf. Porter, 5
Pub. Lands Dec. at 43 (cancelling wife’s filing for entry for failure to show compe-
tent evidence on final proof of desertion).
73. HARTOG, supra note 7 (examining cases of marital separation to help understand
the meaning of marriage).
74. I end my analysis in 1935 for two reasons. First, 1935 is the year when President
Franklin Roosevelt functionally ended homesteading by withdrawing the remain-
ing federally owned land from the public domain. Nat’l Park Serv., supra note 37,
at 3. Although homesteading in the continental United States did not officially
end until 1976, homesteading had drastically slowed down by the 1920s and func-
tionally ended in 1935. Id.; Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 703(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2787–89 (1976). Homesteading stayed
open in Alaska until 1986, but no Alaska cases are featured in this Article. Id. at
§ 702(a); see also NORMA COBB & CHARLES W. SASSER, ARCTIC HOMESTEAD: THE
TRUE STORY OF ONE FAMILY’S SURVIVAL AND COURAGE IN THE ALASKA WILDS
(2000) (telling a family’s story of homesteading in Alaska beginning in 1973). Sec-
ond, by the 1930s, the legal status of women, including their property rights, had
changed drastically. See COTT, supra note 16, at 168 (describing changes to wo-
men’s legal status in the 1930s). The homesteading period began soon after a sea
change occurred in American law: “Between 1845 and 1860, nearly every state in
the union, new and old, held a convention to draft a new constitution.” HARTOG,
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focus on only one type of marital separation: women who were de-
serted by their husbands.75 But Hartog’s description of marital sepa-
rations, and especially his observation that the spouses existed in “a
complex legal netherworld,” are true for the deserted wives in the
homesteading context.76 Under the homestead laws, mutual separa-
tion or a wife’s desertion of her husband did not make the wife eligible
to homestead. Only when a wife was deserted by a husband was she
considered a qualifying homesteader.77 Accordingly, one fundamental
question in all of the cases is whether a wife was deserted (and thus
qualified to homestead as the head of household) or whether she took
part in the decision to separate (in which case she was not qualified to
homestead).78 Of course, the couple may have mutually separated but,
understanding the legal rules of homesteading, strategically con-
structed the husband’s desertion so the wife could make a federal
homestead claim.79
Family law is generally governed by state, not federal, law. Partic-
ularly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, states con-
supra note 7, at 110. The new constitutions, and the accompanying legislation,
moved America away from the common law and changed many legal obligations
“including private law areas like the law of husband and wife.” Id. For example, a
number of states thoroughly debated whether to include property rights for wives
in their constitutions. Id. at 111. The homesteading period also overlapped with a
period of great change in the legal rights and status of women, whether married
or single. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 373; see also infra Part VI (comparing wo-
men’s rights in homesteading to American society at large).
75. HARTOG, supra note 7, at 36. Hartog identified the following five varieties of sepa-
rations, listed from most formal to least formal:
1. divorces á mensa et thoro (that is, judicially ordered separations,
sometimes also called limited divorces from bed and board);
2. separations founded on equitable agreements (separate maintenance
agreements) or enforceable contracts between husband and wife;
3. informal separations of a variety of sorts, including separations
founded on legally unenforceable contracts, abandonments, desertions,
and bigamies.
In addition there were two other categories that did not exist legally at all, but
that still had an important presence in the legal culture:
4. “temporary” separations, not founded on marital conflict;
5. divorces in one jurisdiction, unrecognized in another.
Id.
76. See id. at 29 (“A separated couple was something close to an oxymoron, a wife
without a husband and a husband without a wife, a site of moral danger.”).
77. Roberts, 36 Pub. Lands Dec. 258, 260 (1908) (“There is a clear distinction between
separation by mutual agreement and desertion or abandonment. Only in the lat-
ter event is the wife recognized as the head of a family.”). Even when after an
agreed upon separation the husband failed to support the wife, he continued to be
the head of the household and the separated wife could make no homestead
claim. Brown, 14 Pub. Lands Dec. 459, 460–61 (1892).
78. See, e.g., Porter, 5 Pub. Lands Dec. 42, 42 (1886) (finding wife not deserted be-
cause she had colluded with her husband to arrange the desertion).
79. See, e.g., id.
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trolled the laws governing marriage, children, and the family.80 The
administrative decisions interpreting the homesteading laws are
unique for the time period because federal courts and agencies rarely
had the opportunity to rule on marriage issues during the homestead-
ing period.81 Although some federal laws (for example, immigration
laws) implicated the marriage relationship, “throughout the first 175
years of national government, marriage law was not the business of
Washington.”82 And as a general matter, “the agencies of the federal
government claimed little . . . interest over the law of marriage.”83
State law determined who could marry and how those marriages could
end. In almost all situations, state law also determined the property
rights and support obligations between married, separated, and di-
vorced spouses. But homesteading rights were different; it was federal
law—as interpreted by a federal agency—that determined whether a
wife could homestead, when she became “deserted,” and what rights
she had in contrast to her husband and to strangers. Even though va-
rious states and territories defined marriage and marital rights in dif-
ferent ways during the homesteading period,84 the administrative
decisions do not reference state-specific laws on marriage. Rather,
those decisions refer to the body of developing federal administrative
law to determine when a wife was sufficiently deserted to gain her
own legal right to homestead.85
The “complex legal netherworld” of separation that Hartog de-
scribes was no simpler under the homesteading laws than in normal
American law and society.86 The administrative decisions I study
80. In the last half century, the federal government has made inroads into state con-
trol of family law. These interventions have come from the Supreme Court and
Congress. Starting with Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967), which over-
turned anti-miscegenation statutes in sixteen states, the Supreme Court has de-
cided a number of constitutional cases about the right to marriage. Most recently,
the Supreme Court overturned thirteen state definitions of marriage in
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Congressional intervention in the
family has also increased, including through the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–63 (2012) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2012).
81. See HARTOG, supra note 7, at 16 (“For the better part of two centuries, the agen-
cies of the federal government claimed little constitutional responsibility or inter-
est over the law of marriage.”).
82. Id. at 17.
83. Hendrik Hartog, The Scene of a Marriage: McGuire v. McGuire, in FAMILY LAW
STORIES 219, 229 (Carol Sanger ed., 2008).
84. Id. (“The United States of America was a huge country, defined, at least for the
purposes of marriage, by its absence of central norms or directions. Its distin-
guishing characteristic as a nation was the multiple jurisdictions that described
its legal terms.”).
85. Accordingly, the development of administrative law was much like the develop-
ment of federal common law as allowed in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), over-
ruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
86. HARTOG, supra note 7, at 29.
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show both circumstances where the default rules of marriage and de-
sertion aided women in gaining homesteading rights and circum-
stances where the default rules of marriage hampered the ability of
women to homestead. Although the federal administrative deci-
sionmakers were not bound by state law in determining what consti-
tuted desertion, the rules adopted by the Department of the Interior
showed a general deference to the general understanding of marriage.
This complex tangle of the common law, state and federal law, and
administrative precedent put deserted wives in complicated legal situ-
ations. The following thorough review of administrative decisions un-
wraps the homesteading rights of deserted wives and allows for a
comprehensive analysis. Because the rights changed over time, I start
by describing the general rules and trajectory of the homesteading
rights of deserted wives in Part IV before turning to a more in-depth
discussion of highly litigated issues in Part V.
IV. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE HOMESTEADING RIGHTS OF
DESERTED WIVES
Much has been written about female homesteaders; however, most
of that historical literature focuses on the stories of individual women
without contemplating the laws that governed and influenced how wo-
men acted.87 This Article adds a legal perspective to the existing his-
torical literature on solo female homesteaders as I review and analyze
the laws and regulatory decisions that governed the homesteading
rights of deserted wives. The cases chronicled here are about deserted
wives who lived, at least for a time, with their husbands on what I
term the “marital homesteads.”88 The legal developments, particu-
larly developments created by administrative decisions, provide evi-
dence of the legal status of women and the legal meaning of
marriage.89 The laws and regulatory decisions tell several stories:
That women’s rights to gain ownership of homesteads were progress-
87. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 27 (focusing on the stories of individual women). But
see LINDGREN, supra note 14, at 57–81 (discussing individual stories and also
describing the relevant laws).
88. Another category of deserted wives, those who settled homesteads for the first
time after desertion, are outside the bounds of this Article. As a general matter,
the only legal issue confronted by those women was whether they were suffi-
ciently abandoned before filing in order to qualify as a homesteader. See, e.g.,
Bayliss, 28 Pub. Lands Dec. 503, 509 (1899) (discussing a solo female home-
steader’s legal qualifications to homestead and noting “[s]he was clearly at th[e
time of entry] a deserted wife, and as such entitled to make a homestead entry”).
89. This is not to say that the civil servants determining the homesteading rights of
deserted wives were attempting to change the status of women or the meaning of
marriage. See HARTOG, supra note 7, at 4 (criticizing legal history scholarship
that treats “the opinions of nineteenth-century appellate judges[ ] as covert politi-
cal theory”). Because these civil servants were dealing with “concrete lives, odd
patterns of behavior, [and] failed marriages,” they had to “improvise[ ] solutions
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ing, albeit slowly, during the homesteading era; that deserted wives
held a special place in American marital law; that marriage was
treated differently in homesteading disputes compared to other places
in American law; and that individual women were willing to fight hus-
bands and strangers for ownership of land.
Calling these women “deserted wives” does not mean they had no
agency in deciding whether to continue or terminate their marital re-
lationships. In some instances, these women may have been without
choice in the marital breakdowns, but frequently, these women took
part in the decision to remain married but be separated.90 The admin-
istrative decisions include transitioning rules on women’s rights and
rich language about the expectations of husbands and wives—both
during marriage and once separated. This section lays out the basic
chronology of deserted wives’ homesteading rights. Additional details
and context follow in Part V, which deviates from a chronological
timeline to address three highly litigated issues.
The Land Department, through the Secretary, formally adopted a
policy of stare decisis as early as 1883.91 Absent a statutory change or
“cogent reasons,” the Secretary would look to rules articulated in prior
cases.92 Despite a stated policy on stare decisis, the Secretary was a
political appointee and, unsurprisingly, the administrative decisions
shifted based on who served as the leader of the Land Department.93
The cases tend to follow established rules; however, the Secretary did
change the administrative interpretation of the statutes over time,
and those changes more often than not expanded the homesteading
rights of deserted wives.
Although the Homestead Act of 1862 allowed certain limited cate-
gories of women to homestead and the early interpretations of the act
were clear that single women could homestead and married women
could not, the law was silent as to the homesteading rights of deserted
wives. The General Land Office first confronted the rights of deserted
to the situations before them from legal rules and from tacit assumptions they
drew out of the larger culture.” Id.
90. See, e.g., id. at 48 (telling of a 1790 separation and noting that the wife negotiated
the husband’s departure and “packed his belongings” to aid him in his departure
from the marital home but described herself as a “deserted wife”).
91. Rancho Corte de Madera del Presidio, 1 Pub. Lands Dec. 232, 239 (1882) (“But
the rule of stare decisis is well known and recognized in this Department, and it
is not necessary to restate the fact that a review of its decision will not be entered
upon, except in accordance with the general principles governing rehearings, new
trials, and bills of review in the courts.”).
92. McClintock, supra note 60, at 639.
93. See, e.g., Sean M. Kammer, “No Trespassing”: Railroad Land Grants, the Right of
Exclusion, and the Origins of Federal Forest Conservation, 90 N.D. L. REV. 87,
112–13 (2014) (noting how President Grover Cleveland created a “major shift in
the [General Land Office’s] stance toward land and timber depredations” by ap-
pointing “land reformers” to leadership positions).
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wives in 1864 when it held that deserted wives could maintain the
homesteading rights of their deserting husbands in certain circum-
stances.94 The General Land Office’s first rule allowed a wife to allege
the desertion of her husband and make entry on the land in her own
name; however, she could only do so if she first provided notice to her
husband.95 The notice requirement frustrated the attempts of many
deserted wives to gain homesteads in their own names.
Early congressional intervention to further protect the rights of de-
serted wives was unsuccessful,96 and an 1875 Commissioner opinion
halted all homestead claims by deserted wives.97 Keziah Card, a de-
serted wife, wrote to the Litchfield, Minnesota Register and Receiver
expressing her interest in proving up her husband’s homestead in her
own name and inquiring whether she could obtain residency credit for
her husband’s military service.98 The Commissioner reversed prior
rulings explaining he was “convinced that the rule permitting a wife to
attack the entry of her husband is in violation of the fundamental
principles governing the relation of husband and wife in the matter of
property rights.”99 Accordingly, Keziah Card could not “at any time
make final proof in her own name on the entry made by her husband,
nor c[ould] she whilst the marriage remain[ed] legally valid be permit-
ted to contest the existing entry of her husband.”100 Although a major
setback for deserted wives, this rule did not last long. While a congres-
sional fix was again tried and again failed,101 a solution developed in
the Board of Equitable Adjudication.102
The Board of Equitable Adjudication was a congressional creation
that allowed the General Land Office to grant homestead rights (in-
cluding fee simple title) to settlers who had failed to comply with a
technical aspect of the homestead laws but evinced good faith to home-
stead.103 In 1877, the Board of Equitable Adjudication adopted Rule
27, which established that “[i]n all homestead entries where the hus-
band has deserted his wife and children, if he have any, who have in
good faith complied with the homestead law by residence upon and
cultivation of the land,” the wife could obtain patent to the home-
94. Muhn, supra note 6, at 301–02.
95. Id. at 302.
96. Id. at 303.
97. Mrs. Keziah Card, COPP’S LAND OWNER, July 1875, at 50 (setting forth the Com-
missioner’s opinion).
98. Id. at 50–51.
99. Id. at 51.
100. Id. The Commissioner also declared the deserted wife could not “under any cir-
cumstances relating to any entry of the public lands . . . become entitled to credit
for the military services of her husband during the late war.” Id.
101. Muhn, supra note 6, at 303.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 302–03.
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stead.104 Thus, Rule 27 reversed the 1864 notice requirements and the
1875 prohibition on deserted wives claiming homesteads and was im-
mediately used to provide homesteading rights to deserted wives.105
After the issuance of Rule 27, the homesteading rights of deserted
wives were relatively settled, and several decades of administrative
adjudication proceeded before another major rule change.
Finally, in 1884, a new announcement of the homesteading rights
of deserted wives was provided. The Department of the Interior set
out the following five main rules governing deserted wives in the 1884
case of Bray v. Colby.106 Rule 1 established that only the deserted wife
(if she was living on the homestead) could allege the desertion of her
husband.107 Rule 2 allowed a deserted wife to cancel her husband’s
entry and make entry in her own name.108 Rule 3 allowed a deserted
wife to prove up her husband’s claim as his agent and in his name.109
Rule 4 allowed a deserted wife to use the commutation clause to gain
title to the homestead.110 Rule 5 applied the preceding four rules to a
child under the age of twenty-one if the deserted wife was deceased.111
The important implications of these five rules are discussed in detail
in Part VI. These five rules set forth in Bray v. Colby generally gov-
erned the homesteading rights of deserted wives for the next thirty
years.
In 1913—deciding who had claim to a homestead where the origi-
nal entryman abandoned his homestead, illegally arranged for some-
one else to file on the homestead, deserted his wife, and fled the
country on the same day—the Department of the Interior articulated
a much more liberal view of the rights of deserted wives.112 In that
case, the Commissioner of the General Land Office found the wife had
no recourse because “a homestead entryman ha[d] the right to relin-
quish a homestead entry without the knowledge of his wife.”113 The
Department of the Interior disagreed, stating the rights of deserted
wives in this broad language:
The law grants the right of homestead to the head of a family. Ordinarily, the
wife, not being the head of the family, is denied the right of homestead, but to
compensate, in a measure, for this, the entry devolves upon the wife in the
event of the death of the husband entryman. The Department has uniformly
held that where a family is domiciled upon the land under a homestead entry,
104. Thompson v. Anderson, COPP’S LAND OWNER, Nov. 1879, at 125, 126 (quoting
Rule 27); see also Muhn, supra note 6, at 304 (same).
105. Muhn, supra note 6, at 304.
106. Bray, 2 Pub. Lands Dec. 78 (1884).





112. Inman, 42 Pub. Lands Dec. 507 (1913).
113. Id. at 509.
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it is not within the power of the husband to relinquish the entry, abandon his
family and deliver a relinquishment of entry to another with the view of dis-
possessing his abandoned family. Under such conditions, it is held that upon
the filing of the relinquishment, the wife, domiciled upon the land, has the
right in her own behalf as a deserted wife to make entry for the land.114
The Department, of course, had not “uniformly” protected deserted
wives in such situations; however, by 1913, the law had shifted to pro-
vide greater rights to deserted wives.
Then in 1914, Congress intervened in the homesteading rights of
deserted wives by passing “An Act To provide for issuing of patents for
public lands claimed under the homestead laws by deserted wives.”115
The 1914 Act was “spurred by”116 a letter written by Register, John F.
Armstrong, and Receiver, Samuel Butler, of the Sacramento Land Of-
fice to Congressman John E. Raker of California.117 Armstrong and
Butler explained that they “ha[d] reason to believe that many poor
and hardworking women who ha[d] been deserted by their husbands
ha[d] abandoned their homesteads because of their financial inability”
to secure title.118 If a woman made final proof in her husband’s name,
the husband received patent and could “sell the homestead and im-
provements over the heads of his wife and children if he [was] so in-
clined.”119 Armstrong and Butler argued that the other option from
Bray v. Colby—allowing a deserted wife to file in her own name—was
not any better for deserted wives because many deserted wives were
“very poor” and therefore unable to contest their husband’s entry or
even pay the filing fee.120 They concluded that the rules “work[ed] a
hardship on such women who would like to perfect title and gain a
homestead for their own and their children’s benefit,” and they advo-
cated that Congress allow women to more easily obtain title in their
own names.121
Based on these concerns, the 1914 Act made a number of changes,
including imposing a specific time limitation and allowing deserted
wives to claim residency credit through their husband’s residency.122
114. Id. The “sole question” presented in the case was whether the wife consented or
participated in the sale. The burden was on the new entryman to show the wife
had participated or consented; he failed to meet that burden and the wife was
given the right to make entry on the homestead. Id.
115. Act of Oct. 22, 1914, ch. 335, 38 Stat. 766.
116. Muhn, supra note 6, at 305.
117. Letter from John F. Armstrong, Register, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, and Samuel
Butler, Receiver, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to John E. Raker, Congressman, U.S.
House of Representatives (Apr. 29, 1914) (on file with the U.S. National Archives





122. See infra section V.B (discussing residency credit); section V.C (discussing time
constraints).
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The 1914 Act made it easier for deserted wives to meet the residency
credit of their own accord, meaning fewer had to exercise the Bray v.
Colby option of proving up as agents of their husbands. Additionally,
the 1914 Act reinvigorated the notice and due process requirements
which had gone away after Rule 27.123 The 1914 Act was the last ma-
jor change to the homesteading rights of deserted wives, and the last
case profiled in this Article was issued in 1925.124 Although parts of
the United States remained open for homesteading for another fifty
years,125 by the 1920s, most homesteading had finished and the home-
steading rights of deserted wives were settled. But, of course, more
legal issues arose than appear in this brief history.
V. HIGHLY LITIGATED ISSUES
Beyond the basic rules—first allowing deserted wives to home-
stead after notice, then prohibiting all homesteading by deserted
wives, then allowing homesteading without notice—a number of other
issues were highly contested by deserted wives. This Part discusses
the three issues that appeared most frequently in administrative deci-
sions. Section A discusses how residence—of both husbands and
wives—was determined when a married couple was living apart. Sec-
tion B examines another residency issue: when a deserted wife’s resi-
dency credit began to accrue. Section C discusses various time
restraints on wives alleging desertion. These issues did not necessa-
rily arise in cases where the litigation concerned what constituted a
legally recognizable desertion, but the way the Department of the In-
terior decided these cases reflects an understanding of what qualified
as a desertion.
A. Determining Residency when Husband and Wife Lived
Apart
A critical part of the homesteading process was residing on the
homestead for the minimum number of years—first five years, then
three.126 If an entryman did not show residency during that time pe-
123. Act of Oct. 22, 1914, ch. 335, 38 Stat. 766 (providing issuance of patents for public
lands claimed under the homestead laws by deserted wives). The Act required
that the “posted notices of intention to submit final proof . . . recite the fact that
the proof is to be offered and patent sought by applicant as a deserted wife” and
that this notice be served upon the husband before an application for patent be
submitted. Id.
124. See Elizabeth J. Vaughn, 51 Pub. Lands Dec. 189 (1925) (discussed infra section
V.C).
125. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 703(a),
90 Stat. 2743, 2787–89 (1976) (ending homesteading in the continental United
States in 1976); id. at § 702(a) (ending homesteading in Alaska in 1986).
126. See supra Part II.
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riod, patent would not be issued.127 Accordingly, the General Land Of-
fice frequently had to determine whether the residency requirement
had been met. Although residency issues abounded, one is relevant to
this Article: How should the residency of a married entryman be de-
termined when that entryman and his wife lived apart?
During the nineteenth century, a wife’s domicile followed that of
her husband’s.128 This had major legal implications in nineteenth-cen-
tury America—for example, divorce actions had to be filed in the state
where the husband was domiciled.129 If a wife refused to relocate with
her husband, that refusal could be grounds for divorce by the husband
based on the wife’s abandonment.130 But of course, the homestead
laws did not require entrymen to make the homestead their domicile,
but instead, just their residence, and the rules of residency were not
the same as the rules of domicile.131 In the context of homesteading,
both husbands and wives had reason to argue that a wife’s residency
should necessarily follow her husband’s.
One type of residency dispute case was as follows. Husband and
wife settle on a homestead with husband as the entryman. The hus-
band abandons the homestead and deserts the wife, but the wife con-
tinues to reside on the homestead.132 In these circumstances, “[t]he
homestead [was] not necessarily abandoned” so long as the wife con-
tinued to reside on it.133 But even if a husband’s abandonment did not
forfeit the homestead right,134 a dispute might arise if the wife sought
127. WAPLES, supra note 12, at 932 (noting requirements for receiving patent).
128. Note, The Domicile of a Wife, 26 HARV. L. REV. 447, 447 (1913); see also Comment,
Capacity of a Married Woman to Acquire Separate Domicil, 38 YALE L.J. 381, 381
(1929) (“The domicil of the wife, both in England and in the United States, is, in
general, determined by that of the husband, even though the wife has never lived
at her husband’s domicil.” (footnotes omitted)).
129. Note, The Domicile of a Wife, supra note 128, at 447.
130. See generally Annotation, Divorce—Failure to Follow Husband, 29 A.L.R.2d 474,
476 (1953) (“The husband may choose and fix the domicile of himself and his wife,
if, in doing so, he acts reasonably, and when he properly exercises his right to
select a new domicile, her unjustifiable failure or refusal to accompany or follow
him to the new domicile constitutes desertion or abandonment of him by her
which, if continued for the statutory period, is ground for a divorce against her.”
(footnote omitted)).
131. WAPLES, supra note 12, at 932 (explaining that “[a] claimant must actually and
personally make a settlement upon the land, to avail himself of the law” but not
noting any requirement of actual domicile).
132. See, e.g., Thrasher, 8 Pub. Lands Dec. 626 (1889); Gates, 7 Pub. Lands Dec. 35
(1888).
133. WAPLES, supra note 12, at 934 (“The homestead is not necessarily abandoned by
the husband’s desertion of it and his wife and family who reside thereon. She
becomes the head of the family under such a circumstance, and the entry will not
be canceled to her injury.”).
134. But see id. (noting that “[a]bandonment of the land for a period of six months or
more, after filing the affidavit and making entry,” results in forfeiture of the
homestead right).
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to make entry in her own name. The husband could contest her entry,
arguing that—despite his physical absence—he maintained residency
as required by the homestead laws because his wife resided on the
homestead. The administrative decisions are uniform in this factual
scenario—so long as the husband’s absence was in good faith, the resi-
dency of his wife counted toward his residency.135 In fact, the Depart-
ment of the Interior adopted the general rule that “the residence of a
settler is presumed to be where his family resides.”136 This rule fol-
lows early American understandings of the marital relationship. In
Colonial America, although men were considered the head of house-
hold in interaction with the outside world, a wife could “stand in his
place” if the husband was unavailable.137 Described as a “deputy hus-
band” by Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, a Colonial wife in this situation
could potentially act as a surrogate to the husband,138 much like a
homesteading wife acted as a surrogate for the purpose of accruing her
husband’s residency requirement.
The rule giving husbands credit for wives’ residency allowed mar-
ried men more freedom to move around the country—and perhaps en-
gage in economic activity elsewhere139—than single men or women
who were more strictly held to the residency requirement. Take for
example the contest between husband and wife in Gates v. Gates. The
entryman husband, Alonzo Gates, left the homestead in Dakota Terri-
tory from October 1882 until summer 1885 for the “business necessity”
of operating his saw mill business at a profit in Montana.140 Although
135. See, e.g., Harold Paul, 54 Pub. Lands Dec. 426, 427 (1934) (“[W]here the entry-
man is a single person without family, the physical occupation and personal pres-
ence must be that of himself; but this Department has repeatedly held that the
home of an entryman is presumptively where his family resides, and absence
from the entry of the entryman for the purpose of maintaining his family, though
in some instances covering several unbroken years, is excusable and does not
break the continuity of residence where his family continued to reside upon the
homestead.”); Thrasher, 8 Pub. Lands Dec. at 629 (finding entryman had not
abandoned homestead during six-year absence because of wife’s presence); Ed-
ward C. Ballew, 8 Pub. Lands Dec. 508, 509 (1889) (allowing entryman who lived
and worked off the homestead to receive patent based on his family’s residence on
the homestead); Morris, 9 Pub. Lands Dec. 52 (1889) (finding entryman had not
abandoned his homestead because his two sons, likely illegitimate, lived on the
homestead while the entryman worked in a nearby town); Gates, 7 Pub. Lands
Dec. at 37 (finding entryman had not abandoned homestead during three-year
absence to take care of a business in another state because of wife’s presence).
136. Thrasher, 8 Pub. Lands Dec. at 629.
137. ULRICH, supra note 17, at 36.
138. Id. at 42. A good example from Colonial America is that the wives of fishermen
would conduct business during the extended absences of their husbands. Id. at
41.
139. See, e.g., Gates, 7 Pub. Lands Dec. at 37 (finding residency requirement met
where husband left the South Dakota homestead to take care of a business in
Montana).
140. Id. at 36.
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the wife, Frances Gates, successfully obtained a divorce based on the
nearly three-year desertion of her husband,141 the secretary found
that Alonzo had not abandoned the homestead or his wife for purposes
of federal homestead law.142
Treating the wife’s residence as the husband’s residence meant
that a deserted wife—like Frances Gates—could live alone on a home-
stead for years, but her husband got credit for her residency.143 Al-
though the ability of a wife to accrue credit for her husband appears to
give her some power and rights, her ability to do so was derived solely
from her status as the entryman’s wife.144 But wives were not uni-
formly disadvantaged by the rule giving credit to their husbands—
remember that the rule established in Bray v. Colby prevented anyone
other than the wife from alleging the husband’s abandonment of the
homestead, protecting the marriage from outside intervention and
protecting the wife’s ability to control meeting the residency require-
ment.145 In other words, a wife had superior rights to her husband’s
homestead against everyone except her husband.
A slight variation was the situation where a husband disappeared
for a period of time, but at his return, the wife was willing to resume
the marital relationship. One such situation appeared in the 1889 case
of Thrasher v. Mahoney.146 There, the husband was absent for six
years after making entry on a homestead, but his wife and children
resided on and improved the homestead during his absence.147
Shortly before the husband returned, the wife, believing her husband
dead, attempted to prove up the homestead.148 Before the wife’s appli-
cation could be processed, the husband returned and tried to prove up.
Initially, the husband was denied this right, but on appeal, the hus-
band was allowed to proceed in proving up his land.149 In order to find
the husband met the residency credit, the Secretary focused on the
husband’s good faith in his absence of six years: during the first two
141. Id. at 35.
142. Id. at 37.
143. See, e.g., id. (deciding between homestead claims of then-divorced husband and
wife).
144. Compare the situation of deserted wives to that described by Ulrich in her book
about women in Colonial America. She says: “Colonial women might appear to be
independent, even aggressive, by modern standards, yet still have derived their
status primarily from their relationship to their husbands.” ULRICH, supra note
17, at 42.
145. See, e.g., Thrasher, 8 Pub. Lands Dec. 626, 629 (1889).
146. Id. at 626.
147. Id. at 627.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 629 (allowing Florence Mahoney to proceed through the Board of Equitable
Adjudication to determine whether an exception should be made for his tardiness
in filing the documents to prove up the homestead outside of the seven-year
maximum).
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years, the husband maintained some contact.150 Even more impor-
tant, perhaps, was that the marriage appeared likely to continue: the
husband deeded his interest in the land to his wife.151 It was the hus-
band’s actions after returning to the homestead that “indicate[d] good
faith, and [seemed] to show that he had not intended leaving his fam-
ily without making provision for their maintenance and support.”152
And those actions were enough to find he had adequately maintained
residence during his six-year absence.
On the other hand, the residency of the wife and children could
also cut against the homesteading claims of a husband. Starting with
the established principle that “in the absence of proof to the contrary,
the place where a married man’s family resides must be deemed to be
his residence,”153 the Secretary announced, in an 1889 case, that a
“strong presumption” was raised against the residency of an entryman
when his wife failed to reside upon the homestead.154 In that case, the
husband, an attorney living in town, filed upon a homestead, left his
wife and children residing in town, and commuted between the home-
stead and his office in town during the required period of residency.155
The husband did not cook, eat, or do laundry on his claim.156 The De-
partment cancelled his entry because his residence on the homestead
was “pretended.”157 Accordingly, in some cases, a wife’s location either
on or off the homestead—even though she was not an entryman and
had no legal interest in the homestead—was critical to whether her
husband could meet the residency requirements of the homestead
laws.
While a wife’s residence could be the legally determinative factor
in determining the residence of the husband, this should not be inter-
preted as a legal right for women. Rather, the entire premise of the
rule assumed that a husband decided where the wife lived. The Secre-
tary frequently used language that assumed the husband would al-
ways determine the residence of the wife. The governing rule from
Bray v. Colby gave deserted wives rights “[w]hen the entryman has
established a residence and placed his wife upon the land.”158 In an-
other case the Secretary explained that after marrying his wife, a
150. Id. at 628.
151. Id. at 629.
152. Id.
153. Stroud, 4 Pub. Lands Dec. 394, 395 (1886).
154. Spalding, 8 Pub. Lands Dec. 615, 618 (1889).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Compare id. (finding no bad faith but a mere failure to maintain residence), with
Stroud, 4 Pub. Lands Dec. at 394 (finding entryman met residency requirements
where the husband worked at his store in town but the wife resided, at least in
part, on the homestead).
158. Bray, 2 Pub. Lands Dec. 78, 81 (1884) (emphasis added) (discussing Rule 1).
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homesteader “took her to his homestead.”159 Thus, the wife’s residence
could be legally determinative, but only because it was assumed the
husband dictated where the wife would live.
B. Women Establishing Residency in Their Own Names
While a married woman did not have the legal right to choose her
own residence, a woman gained that right once deserted. Because the
homesteading laws had a residency requirement,160 the Department
of the Interior had to decide at what point a woman’s residence
“counted” toward the statutory residency requirement. How a de-
serted wife’s residency counted changed drastically over time. In 1879,
a woman could claim no residency credit because her husband’s aban-
donment of the homestead (even if that also included leaving behind a
deserted wife) counted as the wife’s abandonment.161 By 1925, a de-
serted wife not only got credit for her husband’s residency prior to her
own, but she also benefited from his credit-earning time in the
military.162
Unless the commutation clause was used, the Homestead Act of
1862 required a five-year residency period between entry and proving
up;163 the Three-Year Homestead Act of 1912 shortened the residency
requirement to three years for all homesteads.164 Regardless of the
minimum residency time required, the homesteading laws did impose
a maximum time—two years past the minimum time period, so either
five or seven years. If an entryman did not prove up the claim within
the maximum time, the homesteading right extinguished for that en-
tryman and the homestead became available for another to make en-
try. When a husband deserted his wife during those seven years, the
legal question arose of when the deserted wife began “residing” on the
homestead.
This legal question can be demonstrated through the case of Jennie
Lindsey.165 Jennie’s husband filed entry on a Colorado homestead in
1887, and she joined him in 1888.166 In 1893, Jennie’s husband de-
serted her and abandoned the homestead.167 In 1895, Jennie con-
tested the entry of her husband, his entry was cancelled, and Jennie
159. Gates, 7 Pub. Lands Dec. 35, 35 (1888) (emphasis added).
160. See supra Part II (discussing the residency requirement, which was most often
three or five years).
161. See Larsen, 1 Pub. Lands Dec. 401 (1882).
162. See Elizabeth J. Vaughn, 51 Pub. Lands Dec. 189, 189 (1925).
163. Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 175) (repealed
1976).
164. Homestead Act of 1912, ch. 153, 37 Stat. 123 (repealed 1976).
165. Jennie W. Lindsey, 24 Pub. Lands Dec. 557 (1897).
166. Id.
167. Id.
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filed on the homestead in her own name as a deserted wife.168 There
are four ways in which the residency could be counted: First, Jennie
could get residency credit starting in 1887 when her husband made
entry; second, Jenny could get residency credit starting in 1888 when
she moved onto the homestead herself; third, Jenny could get resi-
dency credit starting in 1893 when her husband abandoned the home-
stead and deserted her; or, fourth, Jennie could get residency credit
starting in 1895 when she made entry in her own name. Deciding
when Jennie’s residency started implicated the marriage relationship.
The first option treats Jennie as a true agent of her husband—step-
ping into his shoes. The second option treats Jennie as if she had her
own legal right to choose her residency during marriage. The third
option says Jennie could only legally establish her own residency after
desertion. And the fourth option treats Jennie as a complete stranger
to her husband’s legal right.
The Department of the Interior decided this question in different
ways during the fifty years of adjudication covered by this Article. The
trajectory of the administrative decisions determining women’s resi-
dency demonstrates that deserted wives were gaining legal rights over
time. The starting position followed an 1879 Supreme Court opinion,
which held that only the husband held any rights during the proving-
up period.169 According to the Supreme Court, only once an entryman
obtained patent did a wife receive any interest in the land, stating
that “up to that time he alone makes the claim. His acts affecting the
claim are her acts. His abandonment, her abandonment. His neglect,
her neglect.”170 This holding guided early Department of the Interior
opinions, including one in 1882 that required women to be divorced
before accruing time toward settlement.171 Using coverture as a legal
basis, the Secretary started with the proposition that if a woman was
married and under coverture, the actions of her husband were her ac-
tions.172 Accordingly, when a husband abandoned the homestead and
deserted his wife, the Secretary held that “his abandonment of the
land was her abandonment” and the wife could not obtain patent to
the land by relying on any residency time while the couple was mar-
ried.173 The wife was required to wait until after her divorce, when
she became a “feme sole,” before she could comply with the statutory
168. Id.
169. Vance v. Burbank, 101 U.S. 514, 521 (1879).
170. Id.
171. Larsen, 1 Pub. Lands Dec. 401 (1882).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 403.
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requirements.174 The wife was unable to receive credit for her resi-
dency between the abandonment and the divorce.175
Shortly thereafter, in 1884, the Department of the Interior issued
the main set of administrative rules governing deserted wives in Bray
v. Colby.176 In that case, the Department of the Interior reiterated
that “[a] deserted wife cannot make final proof or obtain patent in her
own right by virtue of her husband’s entry.”177 The Department of the
Interior interpreted its earlier caselaw as relying on agency law and,
thus, created a set of rules based on the fact that “a deserted wife or
child [w]as the absent husband’s agent.”178 Accordingly, a wife
“c[ould] have no greater right than her husband” to receive patent.179
If a husband had abandoned the claim, he had no right to prove up,
and accordingly, neither did his deserted wife. Only a widow, not a
wife, could file on a former husband’s claim.180 Accordingly, Bray v.
Colby prevented land offices from giving deserted wives residency
credit for the pendency of the marriage if the woman wanted to gain
title in her own name.181 Still, Bray v. Colby offered multiple paths for
a deserted wife: one was to prove up as the husband’s agent and an-
other was to file in her own name. Under the original Bray v. Colby
rule, if a woman wanted to file in her own name, her residency started
at the time of her new filing.182
In the thirty years between Bray v. Colby and the 1914 Act, “[t]he
basic rules laid out in the Bray v. Colby decision” governed the home-
stead rights of deserted wives,183 but the Secretary slowly liberalized
how deserted wives could claim residency credit. In 1884—only ten
months after Bray v. Colby—the Department of the Interior softened
the residency rules for deserted wives in Mary Lewis.184 Mary and her
husband settled on a homestead in Washington Territory in 1879.185
In 1883, Mary’s husband “deserted his wife and abandoned [his]
174. Id. Although in this case the wife had a protected right of entry as a deserted
wife, the wife did not receive title to the land because her status under coverture
prevented the accumulation of residency credit for the time she lived on the land.
Id.
175. Id.
176. Bray, 2 Pub. Lands Dec. 78 (1884); see supra Part IV (discussing the five rules set
out in Bray v. Colby and their importance to the homesteading rights of deserted
wives).
177. Bray, 2 Pub. Lands Dec. at 78.
178. Id. at 78, 82.
179. Id. at 78.
180. Id. at 79.
181. See id. at 78.
182. Id. at 81.
183. Muhn, supra note 6, at 305.
184. Mary Lewis, 3 Pub. Lands Dec. 187 (1884).
185. Id.
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land.”186 Mary stayed on the land for a while but ultimately moved to
a nearby town to work.187 Mary’s husband filed a relinquishment of
the homestead, and, that same day, someone else filed on the land.188
Mary moved to cancel the newcomer’s entry and applied to reinstate
her husband’s entry.189 But of course, Mary could not reinstate her
husband’s entry: his abandonment was her abandonment.190 Al-
though Mary could not reinstate her husband’s entry, the Department
of the Interior still ruled in her favor because of “her entire good faith”
and allowed her to make entry.191 Mary’s residency period did not
start until she filed in her own name, but she was protected against
the other filer who was declared a trespasser and whose entry was
nullified.192 After the Mary Lewis ruling, a deserted wife was given a
protected status in making entry on her husband’s former claim.
Three years later, in 1886, the Department of the Interior made home-
steading rights more difficult to obtain when it established that a de-
serted wife had to “affirmatively show[ ]” the “fact of desertion” by the
husband.193
An 1894 ruling by the Department of the Interior, based on equita-
ble principles, helped deserted wives by changing the rules on resi-
dency credit.194 This was a case where the husband abandoned his
wife and homestead, and the deserted wife (already having lived on
the homestead for seven years) applied to prove up her husband’s
claim.195 The local commissioner applied the rules from Bray v. Colby,
holding that, despite her residency during the preceding seven years,
she could not prove up on the land because she had not “resided” on it
in her own name.196 The Department of the Interior, abandoning the
rule from Bray v. Colby, allowed the deserted wife to claim her entire
time of residency toward the requirements of the homestead laws.197
This case substantially changed the ability of deserted wives to prove
up homesteads in a timely fashion because they would have already
earned residency credit before even making entry in their own names.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 187–88.
188. Id. (“It has been shown that Gorten filed his declaratory statement February 29,
1884, the very day Lewis’s entry was canceled, and that he alleged settlement
January 12 preceding.”).
189. Id. at 188.
190. This rule was established in Vance v. Burbank, 101 U.S. 514, 521 (1879), and
Larsen, 1 Pub. Lands Dec. 401 (1882).
191. Mary Lewis, 3 Pub. Lands Dec. at 188.
192. Id.
193. Porter, 5 Pub. Lands Dec. 42, 42 (1886).
194. Maggie Adams, 19 Pub. Lands Dec. 242, 242 (1894).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 242–43.
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The next major change occurred in 1914 when Congress passed
“An Act To provide for issuing of patents for public lands claimed
under the homestead laws by deserted wives.”198 The 1914 Act
changed the rules on residency because it allowed the “wife of [a quali-
fied] homestead settler or entryman” to obtain patent to the land “in
her name” if she, “while residing upon the homestead claim and prior
to submission of final proof of residence, cultivation, and improvement
as prescribed by law, ha[d] been abandoned and deserted by her hus-
band for a period of more than one year.”199 A one-year period of de-
sertion was a remarkably short time period for Congress to impose
and was the first clearly defined length of time needed to claim deser-
tion. The 1914 Act required: “That in such cases the wife shall be re-
quired to show residence upon, cultivation, and improvement of the
homestead by herself for such time as when, added to the time during
which her husband prior to desertion had complied with the law,
would aggregate the full amount of residence, improvement, and culti-
vation required by law . . . .”200 By allowing a deserted wife to aggre-
gate her residency time with that of her husband, the 1914 Act created
a faster path to land ownership for deserted wives. Two cases about
the 1914 Act are particularly instructive in how meaningful this
change was.
In 1909, Parley Pratt Musser made entry on a homestead in Salt
Lake City, Utah.201 In 1915, Parley’s wife Jennie “filed in the local
office notice of intent to make final proof, alleging that she had been
deserted by her husband for more than one year.”202 Under the 1914
Act, this case should have been simple and Jennie should have been
allowed to file. However, Jennie was not residing on the homestead,
and the 1914 Act contemplated rights for women who had been aban-
doned “while residing upon the homestead claim.”203 Although Jennie
appears ineligible under a textual reading of the 1914 Act, the Secre-
tary held that the Act was remedial in nature and “showed no purpose
of Congress to require more of the wife than would have been required
of the husband had he completed the entry.”204 Accordingly, Jennie
did not have to show actual residence on the homestead; instead, she
only had to show that the residency of her husband was excused.205
The homesteading laws developed to allow some excuses for non-resi-
dency, and Jennie made the showing that her husband’s absence was
198. Act of Oct. 22, 1914, ch. 335, 38 Stat. 766.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Jennie P. Musser, 44 Pub. Lands Dec. 494, 494 (1915).
202. Id.
203. 38 Stat. at 766.
204. Jennie P. Musser, 44 Pub. Lands Dec. at 495.
205. Id.
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excused.206 The secretary pointed out that “[t]he intent of the act was
to excuse the wife from [the] necessity of waging a contest against her
husband and enabling her to make final proof and get patent direct
without expense and delay of a contest.”207
In 1919, Rexford E. Vaughn, a United States Navy veteran, made
entry on a homestead in California but did not establish residence un-
til 1920.208 Rexford and his wife, Elizabeth, lived on the homestead
periodically over the next three years until Rexford abandoned Eliza-
beth on a trip to San Francisco.209 In 1924, Elizabeth attempted to
prove up her husband’s entry as a deserted wife under the 1914
Act.210 Neither Elizabeth nor Rexford had lived on the homestead a
sufficient amount of time to meet the normal residency requirements.
Rexford, however, as a veteran, was entitled to count his time in mili-
tary service toward his residency requirement.211 The Secretary held
that Elizabeth was entitled to count her husband’s military credit,
and, given his prior service in the United States Navy, Elizabeth was
able to obtain patent to the land despite her very limited periods of
residency on the homestead.212
The changes over time are stark. In 1879, a wife could claim no
residency credit because her husband’s abandonment was considered
her own abandonment and she had no recourse.213 By 1925, a de-
serted wife had far more rights—not only did she get credit for her
husband’s residency prior to her own, but she could also claim any
time benefit he earned from military service.214 Women’s rights did
not advance consistently in every area, but the right to claim resi-
dency credit is an area where progress was steady, and occasionally
swift. The progress in this area followed a general trend in the liberal-
206. Id. Unfortunately, the published case does not reflect why the husband’s absence
was excused.
207. Id.
208. Elizabeth J. Vaughn, 51 Pub. Lands Dec. 189, 189 (1925).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. Military veterans were given special treatment under the homesteading laws,
including that “[t]he time [an entryman] ha[d] spent in the service [wa]s counted
as part of that required for residence.” WAPLES, supra note 12, at 935. The only
time requirement for a military veteran was a one-year residency period; the rest
of the residency period could be met through time in the military. Id. For a dis-
cussion of veterans as homesteaders see Kurt Hackemer, Wartime Trauma and
the Lure of the Frontier: Civil War Veterans in Dakota Territory, 81 J. MIL. HIST.
75 (2017).
212. Elizabeth J. Vaughn, 51 Pub. Lands Dec. at 189. But see Mrs. Keziah Card, supra
note 97, at 51 (setting forth the Commissioner’s holding that “[i]t is not perceived
that under any circumstances relating to any entry of the public lands [a deserted
wife] can become entitled to credit for the military services of her husband during
the late war”).
213. See Larsen, 1 Pub. Lands Dec. 401 (1882).
214. See Elizabeth J. Vaughn, 51 Pub. Lands Dec. at 189.
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ization of women’s property ownership over a similar time period,215
and the swiftness of change can largely be understood as a function of
changing administration in the Department of the Interior.
As for Jennie Lindsey—our deserted wife claiming residency credit
which could be calculated from four different dates—the local General
Land Office only gave her residency credit after her husband’s deser-
tion.216 But the Secretary reversed—Jennie received residency credit
from the moment she moved onto the homestead, even though the
homestead was then in her husband’s name.217 Practically, this
meant that by the time Jennie made entry on the land, she had al-
ready met the residency requirement and was able to prove up imme-
diately.218 Being able to obtain fee simple title to a homestead was of
great value to homesteaders, and the progression in this area of law
had a definite impact on deserted wives.
C. Time Restraints on Alleging Desertion
Once a wife was deserted, she faced the decision of when to allege
the marital desertion and her husband’s abandonment of the home-
stead. Only by alleging these two things could she then make entry on
the marital homestead under her own name. If a woman filed too
quickly (perhaps indicating bad faith) or too slowly (perhaps forfeiting
her rights), her claim might be challenged by others wanting to make
entry on the land. If a husband abandoned his homestead leaving be-
hind a deserted wife and no one else tried to claim the land, the de-
serted wife was not forced to allege the abandonment or make entry in
her own name until the proving-up period of her husband was at an
end—seven years after entry. But of course, a deserted wife had no
right to her husband’s homestead without further action and her resi-
dency did not necessarily counteract her husband’s abandonment. Ac-
cordingly, complications arose when a third-party settler sought entry
on the “abandoned” homestead, even if it was still occupied by a de-
serted wife.
All of the cases in this section were between a deserted wife trying
to claim her husband’s abandoned homestead and a claimant who had
no prior legal relationship to the land. Procedurally these cases are
similar. Once a homestead was abandoned, a new homesteader could
make entry. But federal law protected those already residing on the
homestead, including a deserted wife. Accordingly, in the cases that
follow, the litigation was between a new settler alleging there had
been an abandonment and a deserted wife alleging she had priority.
215. See generally Siegel, Marital Status Law, supra note 19; Siegel, Home as Work,
supra note 19.
216. Jennie W. Lindsey, 24 Pub. Lands Dec. 557, 557 (1897).
217. Id.
218. Id.
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Several of the cases concerning time limitations involve situations
where the entryman husband “sold” a relinquishment. When an entry-
man failed to meet the requirements of the proving-up period or other-
wise abandoned his or her claim, the claim was considered
relinquished and reverted to the control of the federal government. At
that point, a new entryman could file on the claim. Some homestead-
ers illegally “sold” their relinquishment—for a fee—by arranging to
relinquish their homestead immediately before a new filer made en-
try.219 In these situations, the litigated cases were frequently between
the new entryman (the purchaser of the relinquishment) and a wife
who had been abandoned but was claiming an interest in the home-
stead as a deserted wife.
The deserted wives’ claims were based on an 1880 law entitled “An
act for the relief of settlers on public lands.”220 That law provided a
settler who was already living on a piece of public land three months
to “file his homestead application and perfect his original entry in the
United Stated land-office.”221 During the first three months after set-
tlement, preference was given to the settler currently living on the
claim, even if the settler was not the first to make entry. This three-
month preference was also given to deserted wives—the three-month
clock started at the moment the husband abandoned the home-
stead.222 Once a settler made entry, “his right . . . relate[d] back to the
date of settlement,” meaning the residency requirement period
backdated to settlement, not entry.223 The preference for a current
resident expired after the three-month period, and others could then
file entry on the land. This law provided some protection for deserted
wives. If a wife alleged her husband abandoned the homestead, she
was given a preference right for that homestead so long as she acted
within three months of his abandonment. But a husband who sold his
relinquishment, knowing his wife had a three-month preference pe-
riod, could stall her from making entry during that time period.
For example, in Tyler v. Emde, a case out of Kansas, the husband—
after making entry and before proving up—formed a conspiracy with
another man where the husband would abandon his homestead, sell
the relinquishment rights and improvements, and keep the entire
219. Richard Edwards, Changing Perceptions of Homesteading as a Policy of Public
Domain Disposal, 29 GREAT PLAINS Q. 179, 197 (2009).
220. Act of May 14, 1880, ch. 89, 21 Stat. 140, 140–41.
221. Id.
222. Muhn, supra note 6, at 302, n. 90; see also Herwig, 28 Pub. Lands Dec. 482, 482
(1899) (“A deserted wife, the head of a family, who is a settler on the land em-
braced within her husband’s homestead entry, at the time of its relinquishment,
is entitled to make entry thereof, if she asserts her settlement right within three
months after cancellation of her husband’s entry.”).
223. § 3, 21 Stat. at 141.
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agreement secret from his wife.224 The husband and the conspirator
entered into a contract; on that same day the husband relinquished
his rights and the new settler filed a declaratory statement for the
land, alleging settlement on that date.225 The contract itself, for the
sale of the relinquishment rights, was void as against public policy.
But beyond that, the husband and conspirator knew they had to hide
the contract from the wife for the three months that she could exercise
her preference right. Accordingly, for three months, the husband and
conspirator hid the contract, pretending the conspirator had only pur-
chased three acres of the homestead while the wife continued to live
on the homestead.226 Somehow—unfortunately not preserved in the
record—the wife discovered the conspiracy in time to file her own en-
try as a deserted wife on the last day of her three-month protected
period, thus gaining her own rights to the homestead.227 If she had
filed entry one day later, the conspiracy would have worked to deprive
the wife of any right to the homestead on which she had lived and
worked for years.
A similar factual scenario happened in Sinnett v. Cheek, where a
husband relinquished his Missouri homestead entry on the same day
that a new settler made an entry on the homestead.228 This husband,
however, removed the wife from the homestead before his relinquish-
ment by “t[aking] her and their children to her father’s house in an
adjoining county on a pretended visit, but did not return for them,
although he promised to do so.”229 Ten months later the wife made
entry in her own name, alleging her rights as a deserted wife.230 Al-
though recognizing that “her absence from the land while on a visit to
her father was enforced by the failure of her husband to take her back
to the homestead as he had promised,” the Secretary denied the wife’s
claim—her prior-residency preference had expired.231 The new settler
gained the right to entry, and—although not reflected in the record—
224. Tyler, 12 Pub. Lands Dec. 94, 94–95 (1891).
225. Id. at 94.
226. Id. at 94–95. It is worth noting that a homesteader could not alienate any or all of
the homestead during the proving-up period. WAPLES, supra note 12, at 946–47
(discussing limits on alienability during the proving-up period).
227. Tyler, 12 Pub. Lands Dec. at 97 (“Excluding the first day, December 19, Mrs.
Tyler had all day of March 20, 1886, to place her claim of record, and this without
reference to the conspiracy. She made entry on the latter date.”).
228. Sinnett, 28 Pub. Lands Dec. 20, 20 (1899).
229. Id. at 20–21.
230. Id. at 21.
231. Id. (“Whatever right she may have had to make entry of this particular land as
the deserted wife of Sinnett must have depended upon her settlement upon the
land at the date of the cancellation of his entry, and this right could only have
been preserved and maintained by proper proceedings in the land office within
three months from the initiation of her right, either by making entry of the land
or by filing within that period a contest against the entry of Cheek.”).
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the husband likely profited from an illegal sale of his relinquishment.
The only reason for different outcomes in Tyler v. Emde and Sinnett v.
Cheek is the speed with which the wife realized her husband sold the
relinquishment and the speed with which she filed entry in her own
name. In Tyler v. Emde, the wife filed within the three-month pro-
tected window; in Sinnett v. Cheek, the wife did not.
Although a deserted wife had only three months to make entry
with protected status against subsequent settlers, the law initially im-
posed no minimum time limit for making entry. In Pawley v. Mackey,
the husband deserted the wife and homestead on May 12, 1888, and
the deserted wife made entry just over a month later on June 13,
1888.232 A contester challenged her right to make entry as a deserted
wife, and, after dismissing the contester’s other arguments, the Secre-
tary turned to the question of whether the wife had made entry too
soon after the desertion.233 The Commissioner who adjudicated the
case found the wife had no homestead interest in the land because of
the short period of time between the desertion and her making en-
try.234 The Secretary reversed this conclusion, finding that the length
of time of desertion was irrelevant to the legal question of whether the
wife was deserted and noting that a wife is “as much . . . abandoned
. . . in five days as in as many months, where the fact of abandonment
is made to appear.”235 Pointing out that “it was but natural that she
should make the entry at the earliest opportunity, in order to protect
her improvements valued at $1,000, from entry by another party,” the
Department of the Interior affirmed the rights of the deserted wife to
make entry on the homestead.236 The 1914 Act changed this rule and
imposed a one-year waiting period on a deserted wife. In order for a
deserted wife to make entry after the 1914 Act, she had to show that
the husband had abandoned the homestead and deserted the wife “for
a period of more than one year.”237
Although technical in nature, the time limit cases are relevant to
understanding the marital relationship. These cases arose only in sit-
uations where a new settler was waiting and ready to challenge the
right of a deserted wife to homestead. A short duration between the
abandonment and the wife making entry could look suspicious to out-
siders and the government—perhaps it showed collusion with the hus-
band—but was not alone a reason to deny the validity of her entry. On
the other hand, if a deserted wife waited too long before making entry
232. Pawley, 15 Pub. Lands Dec. 596, 596 (1892).
233. Id. at 597–98. One of the arguments dismissed by the Secretary was that the
husband and wife had colluded on his abandonment and her entry. Id. at 597.
234. Id. at 597–98.
235. Id. at 598.
236. Id. The deserted wife died shortly after making her entry on the homestead but
devised all of her property to her brother. Id. at 596–97.
237. Act of Oct. 22, 1914, ch. 335, 38 Stat. 766.
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in her own name, she could lose her preference right on the home-
stead. For the vast majority of deserted wives, there was no new en-
tryman trying to claim the homestead, and in those circumstances, a
deserted wife had a full seven years from her husband’s settlement to
allege the desertion and make entry in her own name.
VI. TRENDS AND THEMES IN THE HOMESTEADING RIGHTS
OF DESERTED WIVES
Understanding the homesteading rights of deserted wives cannot
happen in a vacuum. Those rights were shaped by the legal and social
meaning of marriage, the rights of deserted wives outside of the home-
steading context, and the simultaneous women’s rights movement.
The homesteading period profiled in this Article—1862 until 1935—
occurred at the same time as many other changes in family law and
women’s rights. For example, the Seneca Falls convention happened
in 1848,238 and women gained suffrage in 1920.239 During that period
of American history, coverture formally went away and family law
was liberalized in other ways.240 As such, it should not be surprising
that the cases profiled in this Article demonstrate a similar trend—a
liberalization of the law of marriage and of women’s property
ownership.241
This Part begins by looking at how the rules and norms of mar-
riage interacted with homesteading rights. Then this Part examines
three trends that appear in the homesteading context and also in
other litigation about marriage and separation. The role of fault, the
relationship with privatizing dependency, and the protection of mari-
tal privacy are examined in depth for their relevance to the home-
steading rights of deserted wives. These three issues are also
contextualized with the law of marriage and separation in the rest of
America during the same timeframe.
A. Interaction with Other Marital Rules
Although important differences existed between the rights of
homesteading wives and the rights of most wives in America, the un-
238. Elizabeth Myette Coughlin & Charles Edward Coughlin, Convention in Pet-
ticoats: The Seneca Falls Declaration of Woman’s Rights, TODAY’S SPEECH, Fall
1973, at 17.
239. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
240. See, e.g., Siegel, Marital Status Law, supra note 19; Siegel, Home as Work, supra
note 19; John, supra note 50, at 143–44; Note, The Domicile of a Wife, supra note
128, at 447 (noting that by 1913 jurisdictions allowed women to sue for divorce in
their domicile rather than just in that of their husband).
241. See generally supra Part IV (describing the change in homesteading rights over
time for deserted wives and noting that the changes concerning women’s rights
were generally progressive).
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derlying assumptions and rules about marriage, separation, and re-
marriage governed homesteaders as well as the rest of the population.
Bigamy statutes, married women’s property rights, and husbands’
support obligations all interacted with homesteading rights.
Bigamy statutes, which prohibited remarriage during the life of a
current spouse, declared as null and void any subsequent marriage
entered into while a current spouse—even if separated—was still
alive.242 Although a bigamy statute could easily leave a woman single
despite her attempted marriage to an already married man, thus
stripping her of any marital property rights, the bigamy prohibition
also helped at least some women. One example comes from the case of
Herwig v. Cooper.243 Tosha Herwig settled a homestead in New Orle-
ans with her husband, but he deserted Tosha and the homestead
before he received patent to the land.244 Tosha’s husband relinquished
the homestead at the same time that James Cooper filed to make en-
try.245 Tosha filed her own entry within three months of her hus-
band’s relinquishment and alleged that the relinquishment sale to
James Cooper was illegal.246 The local land office denied Tosha’s
claim finding that Tosha had remarried; therefore, she could not bene-
fit from the three-month protected period and had no right as a mar-
ried woman to homestead.247 On appeal, the Secretary held that
because her second marriage was bigamous—and therefore void—
Tosha was able to use the bigamy prohibition to retain her rights as a
deserted wife and receive the right to entry on her first husband’s
homestead.248
Laws governing property ownership and spousal support were also
highly relevant to the homesteading rights of deserted wives. The his-
torical understanding of marital property starts with understating
that husband and wife were considered one person under the law, and
that one person was the husband.249 Elaborate rules about property
ownership developed under the common law, in part to protect wives
242. See generally 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 57 (2011) (“A person who is already mar-
ried is incapable of contracting to marry another, and a marriage thus contracted
is void.” (footnote omitted)).
243. Herwig, 28 Pub. Lands Dec. 482, 482 (1899).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 483.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 484 (“From all this it sufficiently appears that her marriage to Hays
during the lifetime of Herwig, from whom she had not been divorced, was null
and void, and consequently, she is yet the legal though deserted wife of Herwig,
the head of a family and entitled to make entry on the tract in question by virtue
of her settlement thereon at the date of the relinquishment by Herwig.”).
249. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 146, 322–23; Thomas E. Simmons, Medicaid as Cover-
ture, 26 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 275, 285 (2015).
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who, for a time, had no legal rights to own or manage property.250
During the homesteading period, dower rights, the elective share, and
the developing rules of marital property established some property
rights for married women.251 But these protections had little rele-
vance for homesteading settlers because an entryman had no property
rights until after receiving patent. Under the homestead laws, the
United States passed only a possessory interest in the land until the
entryman completed the requirements of the relevant statute and re-
ceived patent to the land.252 “The statutory grant was to the settler;
but if he was married the donation, when perfected, inured to the ben-
efit of himself and his wife in equal parts.”253 Accordingly, during the
proving-up period, a wife held no property rights, accrued no dower
rights, and could claim no elective share or marital property rights to
the land. Only upon the husband receiving patent to the land did a
wife gain any property rights to the homestead.254 As seen through
the cases on relinquishment, this system could incentivize husbands
to avoid receiving patent in order to avoid problems of marital prop-
erty and dower.
Finally, the husband’s support obligation intersected with home-
steading rights. Under coverture, and extending into the twentieth
century, husbands had a duty to support their wives, but wives did not
have a reciprocal support obligation. The support obligation of a hus-
band to his wife created a societal interest in keeping marriages in-
tact.255 To the extent that a deserting husband meant a wife would be
on public support, the government was strongly incentivized to pre-
vent desertions, which was done through bigamy prohibitions, civil li-
ability for a wife’s necessities, and criminal sanctions for desertion.256
In the context of homesteading, however, the calculation of risk to so-
ciety was different. If a husband deserted a wife, a government rule
prohibiting her from exercising rights as the head of the household
only made her more dependent on the government, not less depen-
dent. The outcome was different (granting women more property
rights), but the rationale was the same—regardless of whether women
were supported through husbands or land ownership, the government
did not want to be directly supporting deserted wives. The West,
unique in its land resources and unique in its high level of marital
desertion, created a unique space where coverture and women’s prop-
250. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 146.
251. See id. at 322.
252. See, e.g., Vance v. Burbank, 101 U.S. 514, 519 (1879) (discussing the Donation
Act); WAPLES, supra note 12, at 952–53 (describing the title to the homestead at
various points of the process).
253. Vance, 101 U.S. at 521.
254. Id.
255. COTT, supra note 16, at 169.
256. See id. at 169–70.
2020] HOMESTEADING RIGHTS OF DESERTED WIVES 461
erty rights operated differently. When husbands deserted, the govern-
ment simply gave the “free” land to the deserted wives.
B. The Role of Fault
No rule articulated a fault-based distribution of homesteading
rights between spouses, yet the cases show that fault played a role in
the allocation of homesteading rights. The confluence of two general
legal rules probably led to the focus on fault. First—from the law of
homesteading—good faith was required as an element of proving
up.257 Second—from the law of marriage—allocating fault in a failed
marriage was critical because “[t]hroughout the United States, the
law was dedicated to discouraging separations and divorces and to
punishing those responsible.”258 These requirements arose indepen-
dently out of completely different areas of law—federal versus state
and land-grant versus domestic relations—yet the confluence of the
good faith requirement in homesteading and the fault analysis in mar-
ital relations meant that fault slipped its way into the legal analysis of
homesteading rights.
The good faith requirement in the Homesteading Act included, but
was not limited to, the following mandates: Settlers were supposed to
homestead only for their own purposes, not on behalf of others; specu-
lators were disallowed; and a patent would only be issued if a settler
acted in good faith in fulfilling the requirements of the homestead
laws. The requirements of residency and improvement were, in large
part, about good faith. In fact, the Department of the Interior ex-
plained that “[t]he element of good faith [wa]s the essential foundation
of all valid claims under the homestead law[s].”259 The focus on good
faith in meeting the requirements of the homesteading laws helps to
257. See supra Part II (noting good faith required to obtain patent); see also Edward C.
Ballew, 8 Pub. Lands Dec. 508 (1889) (reversing the Commissioner’s decision that
acquisition of title was not in good faith and holding good faith existed at time of
entry even though entryman subsequently decided to move his family off of the
land after proving up).
258. HARTOG, supra note 7, at 63–64; see also BRANDT, supra note 10, at 25–26, 30–33
(listing bad habits of deserting husbands and deserted wives as a factor to be
considered in the cause of marital desertion). “In one sense, therefore, it is always
the man’s fault [that he deserted]; in another it is always, also, the woman’s; in
still another, it is the fault of ungentle circumstances. But generally there is a
combination of responsibility, with a fairly clear indication of where the burden of
it belongs.” Id. at 39.
259. McGuilvery, 46 Pub. Lands Dec. 492, 492 (1918). The homesteading laws were
written with specific requirements in a way that they “provide[d] [their] own evi-
dence of good faith in improvement, cultivation, and residence; if these exist[ed]
as facts, the law [wa]s satisfied.” Harold Paul, 54 Pub. Lands Dec. 426, 428
(1934). When “things done on the land [we]re sufficient to warrant good faith,”
the Land Department was required to “infer good faith” on the part of the home-
steader. Id.
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explain why the commissioners of the Land Department and the sec-
retaries of the Department of the Interior were so focused on allocat-
ing fault between husbands and wives.
Outside of the homesteading context, fault played a role in the con-
tinuing support obligations and distribution of property at marital
separation.260 Fault also played a role in other litigation about hus-
bands and wives, such as cases where a wife sued over her husband’s
drunkenness and was denied damages because she was negligent in
not stepping in to stop his drinking.261 The governing legal rules and
their development as discussed in Parts II and III do not, on their face,
take into account fault for marital desertion. However, a closer exami-
nation of a number of cases shows how fault appears to frequently be
the deciding factor in the outcome of the cases. With few exceptions,
the desertion cases decided by the Secretary were with regard to de-
serting husbands and deserted wives.262 There are two reasons for
this: First, if a wife deserted a homestead and husband, there were no
legal implications for the homestead; second, husbands—who had bet-
ter economic opportunities and greater freedom of movement—were
more likely to desert than wives.263 Of course, just because the hus-
band was the deserter does not mean he was necessarily the marital
party at “fault” for the marital breakdown.
The role of fault in the administrative decisions is easiest to iden-
tify when the challenge was between two spouses. Consider, for exam-
ple, the litigation between Frances and Alonzo Gates.264 After Alonzo
made entry on a homestead in Dakota Territory and married Frances,
who moved onto the homestead, Alonzo left for three years.265 Frances
alleged her husband deserted her and abandoned the homestead, and
she sought to make entry in her own name. The Secretary disagreed,
portraying Alonzo as an innocent spouse acting in good faith—Alonzo
260. See HARTOG, supra note 7, at 160–64 (discussing husband’s support obligations
and wife’s property rights after separation). As the law of divorce continues to
move toward a no-fault model, fewer jurisdictions use fault to determine property
rights and support obligations. However, fault still plays a role in some support
obligations. See, e.g., Fausch v. Fausch, 697 N.W.2d 748, 755 (S.D. 2005) (“The
factors for a trial court to consider in exercising its discretion [to award spousal
support] . . . include . . . (6) the relative fault of the parties in the termination of
the marriage.” (quoting Guindon v. Guindon, 256 N.W.2d 894, 898 (S.D. 1977))).
261. John, supra note 50, at 155.
262. But see Kamanski, 9 Pub. Lands Dec. 186, 186 (1889) (adjudicating case with
regard to a deserting wife).
263. COTT, supra note 16, at 38 (“Because it was so difficult for women to travel alone
safely and find a livelihood in a new place, husbands were the main deserters.”);
BRANDT, supra note 10, at 9 (noting that of 591 records of deserting spouses col-
lected, only seventeen were of wives deserting husbands).
264. Gates, 7 Pub. Lands Dec. 35, 35 (1888); see supra section V.A (discussing Gates as
one of many cases about how residency was determined when the husband and
wife resided apart).
265. Gates, 7 Pub. Lands Dec. at 35.
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had a valid reason for being gone, sent some money during his ab-
sence, and even paid for land that Frances owned.266 The Secretary
also portrayed Frances as the guilty spouse in the marital break-
down—Frances “forcibly opposed [Alonzo’s] entrance to his own
house” upon his return to the homestead and divorced him, depriving
her of any rights to challenge his residency.267 The only legally rele-
vant aspect of “good faith” in this context was the reason for Alonzo’s
absence, yet the Secretary also portrayed Frances as being at fault for
refusing to take back her husband after a three-year absence.268 In a
case only a decade earlier, the Commissioner had taken the opposite
approach, noting that for purposes of determining whether the de-
serted wife could make entry in her own name he did “not deem it
essential . . . to inquire what part [the deserted wife] took in the mat-
ter of her husband leaving her and the land.”269
The more common scenario in these cases involved a bad-acting
husband and an innocent wife, in part because deserting husbands
held more power in the relationship. The most atrocious of bad-acting
husbands were those who conspired to sell a homestead relinquish-
ment and desert the wife to assure she would receive no right to the
homestead. The administrative decisions are uniform in protecting de-
serted wives in these instances. Husbands attempting to deny women
their statutory property rights were not unique to the homesteading
context. Men tried various methods of conveying land to deprive wo-
men of the marital interest in land.270 However, deserting husbands
exercised a special kind of power over wives in the context of home-
stead rights.
Unlike holding fee simple title to real estate during marriage, mak-
ing entry on a homestead did not guarantee any property rights to an
entryman’s wife. A homestead, before a patent was issued, was not
owned by the husband and was not covered by dower or the developing
marital property regimes.271 Husbands could sell their interest in a
homestead without fear of a wife claiming any right to the homestead.
Accordingly, until patent was issued, a husband’s abandonment or re-
linquishment was also a wife’s abandonment or relinquishment unless
266. Id. at 36 (“[Alonzo] sent money home to his said wife during his absence, wrote to
her, but received no reply, paid her bill for drugs and medicine, and engaged his
friends to look after her.”).
267. Id. at 38 (citing Bray, 2 Pub. Lands Dec. 78 (1884)).
268. Id.
269. Thompson v. Anderson, COPP’S LAND OWNER, Nov. 1879, at 125 (setting forth the
Commissioner’s decision).
270. See, e.g., HARTOG, supra note 7, at 21 (recounting an 1884 attempted divorce
where the husband conveyed his real property to a family member in order to
“cheat” his wife out of her marital interest in the land).
271. Vance v. Burbank, 101 U.S. 514, 514 (1879) (“A wife, or her heirs, gets nothing
under [the Donation Act] before her husband or some one for him proves up the
claim.”).
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the wife qualified as deserted.272 Men obviously understood this prin-
ciple: if planning to desert a wife, a husband could transfer the home-
stead right before making final proof to avoid dealing with property
claims. And husbands did this.
As just one example, in 1884, Moses and Malvina Tyler took up
residence on a homestead in Kansas, but by 1885 the marriage was
breaking down.273 Moses threatened to relinquish the homestead and
abandon his wife and two children.274 Thereafter, Moses tried to sell
the relinquishment and improvements on three occasions; the first
two Malvina was able to thwart by telling the buyers “ ‘that she in-
tended to stay on the land,’” but on his third attempt Moses was suc-
cessful.275 Moses “entered into a conspiracy” to sell the
relinquishment rights in order to deprive Malvina of any right of entry
she would have as a deserted wife.276 Despite the husband’s attempts
to deprive Malvina of her rights by hiding the sale from her until the
time period for her to file had expired, the Secretary ultimately al-
lowed Malvina to make entry on the homestead.277 Facing the ques-
tion of whether Malvina had made entry in a timely fashion, the
Secretary concluded she had, in part because Moses had conspired
against her.278 Similar results—insofar as the wife was allowed to
make entry—occurred in almost all the conspiring-husband cases.279
Although it was clear that Moses Tyler was conspiring to keep his
wife from gaining any property rights,280 it was not always clear in
the cases that a husband had illegally arranged to “sell” his home-
stead rights by arranging a relinquishment. For example, in Mary
Lewis, the Secretary never found that the deserting husband colluded
with the new filer, but the evidence points in that direction—the hus-
band relinquished on the same day the challenger filed on the prop-
erty.281 Even without reciting evidence of any malicious intent on
behalf of the husband or the new entryman, and although Mary had
no legal rights to the entry previously made, the Secretary canceled
272. Id. at 521; Larsen, 1 Pub. Lands Dec. 401 (1882).
273. Tyler, 12 Pub. Lands Dec. 94, 94 (1891).
274. Id.
275. Id. (quoting the findings of the local land officers).
276. Id. at 94–95.
277. Id. at 97.
278. Id. The time limits imposed on Malvina Tyler came from the May 14, 1880 Act
entitled “An act for the relief of settlers on public land.” Act of May 14, 1880, ch.
89, 21 Stat. 140. See supra section V.D for additional discussion of the time limits
for deserted wives to file on homesteads in their own names.
279. See, e.g., Michaelis v. Michaelis, 44 N.W. 1149, 1149–50 (Minn. 1890) (“And this
right of the deserted wife the department will respect, and will not permit to be
defeated by a fraudulent and collusive relinquishment by the husband, in hostil-
ity to her rights.”).
280. Tyler, 12 Pub. Lands Dec. at 95.
281. Mary Lewis, 3 Pub. Lands Dec. 187, 188 (1884).
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the entry of the newcomer and allowed Mary to make entry in her own
name.282 The Secretary mentioned Mary’s “good faith” twice in justify-
ing its decision—apparently the determinative factor in a close case,
or perhaps just the rationalization the Secretary used to justify the
ultimate outcome.283
That the administrative decisionmakers frequently helped the “in-
nocent” party gain homesteading rights is not surprising. This is not
to say that the decisions giving legal victory to deserted wives were
attempts to improve the legal status of women because “even in-
tensely patriarchal judges” would have wanted a marriage regime
that was stable and condoned permanence and duties—a marriage re-
gime “that distinguished good husbands from . . . bad husbands.”284 In
many of the profiled cases, there was no “innocent” spouse, and in
others there was no “guilty” spouse. Many desertions in America were
not nefarious, particularly in the time and place of homesteading:
“The search for work, for land, for economic survival, split couples
apart as they moved across the United States.”285
Yet the moral statements in the cases—including statements
about Moses and Malvina Tyler and Mary Lewis—fit within the larger
understanding of acceptable separations in American law. Although
the husband was necessarily the head of household, “[t]here were situ-
ations [in American society] where separation was the morally right
thing to do, where a wife had a moral obligation to separate herself
from her erring husband.”286 The Department of the Interior, how-
ever, showed a propensity to protect deserted wives when their hus-
bands had done something so reprehensible that the marriage was
irreparably damaged. For example, in the 1889 case of Kamanski v.
Riggs, a husband and wife settled a Nebraska homestead together.287
After two years, the wife left the homestead, but her “departure was
caused by her husband’s brutal treatment” and adultery with another
woman.288 After the husband left the county, the wife made home-
282. Compare id., with Elliott, 28 Pub. Lands Dec. 143, 145 (1899) (finding deserted
wife had no interest in property, in part because “[t]here [wa]s not the slightest
evidence of any collusion” between the husband and the later entryman).
283. Mary Lewis, 3 Pub. Lands Dec. at 188 (“Her allegations evidencing her good faith
are uncontroverted . . . . It is true that Mrs. Lewis has not made entry, but, hav-
ing evidenced her entire good faith, I think . . . [she] should be permitted [to make
entry].”).
284. HARTOG, supra note 7, at 5.
285. Id. at 23.
286. Id. at 37; see also BRANDT, supra note 10, at 31 (explaining—but not justifying—
husbandly desertion and noting “some indulgence is ready for the man whose
wife was both lazy and extravagant or for the one whose wife was accustomed to
‘drink, beg, fight and lie,’ even though the men were not much better”).
287. Kamanski, 9 Pub. Lands Dec. 186, 186 (1889).
288. Id.
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stead entry on her own behalf as a deserted wife.289 A potential entry-
man made challenge to whether the wife was truly deserted. The facts
show that the husband did his best to keep her from receiving the
protections of a deserted wife—the husband sent two dollars, and then
ten dollars, to the wife in an attempt to show he was supporting
her.290 The wife refused the money, believing it was an attempt to
undermine her homestead claim as a deserted wife.291 In litigation
between the wife and the challenger, the Secretary agreed, excusing
the wife’s initial desertion of the husband because “she was driven
away by personal violence” and noting that the “trifling remittances”
attempted by the husband were merely an attempt to ruin the wife’s
homestead claim “rather than an effort to support the claimant and
children.”292 The Secretary did not hold back in concluding that:
As I view the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, it would be mer-
ciless and unjust that this woman, who, in virtuous indignation, conscious of
her injury and suffering; tortured by the shameful conduct of one who should
love and cherish her; her soul embittered and her affections dried up by the
libidinous conduct of her husband; deserted and abandoned by him as she is
for the unlawful embrace of another, while refusing his proffered cankerous
two dollars, should still be held to be supported and maintained by him.293
James Himsworth, who raped the fifteen-year-old daughter of his wife
Hannah while the couple was residing on their Washington home-
stead, was a similarly sinister husband.294 Hannah divorced her hus-
band, which should have terminated any rights she had to his
homestead.295 Although Hannah should have had no protected right
to make entry on her ex-husband’s homestead as a divorced woman,
the Secretary treated her as a deserted wife (though she clearly was
not) and allowed her to make entry.296 These two cases feature the
most reprehensible men I found in the Secretary’s published opinions,
and in both instances, the wife received the right to make entry. But
289. Id.
290. Id. at 187.
291. Id.
292. Id. Sending such a small amount of money likely would not have protected a
husband from a claim of desertion. Intermittent visits and support did not neces-
sarily end a desertion. See BRANDT, supra note 10, at 58–60 (discussing the later
actions of men who deserted and were still considered deserters despite some
contact and support of wives and children).
293. Kamanski, 9 Pub. Lands Dec. at 188.
294. Sugden, 22 Pub. Lands Dec. 356, 357 (1896) (“That on the 30th day of September,
1892, that said James Himsworth was in the superior court of Spokane county,
State of Washington, convicted of the crime of rape committed upon the fifteen
year old daughter of this affiant by a former husband, and was upon said convic-
tion duly sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary of the State of Washing-
ton, located at Walla Walla, for a period of fifteen years, and is now imprisoned in
said penitentiary under said sentence.”).
295. Id. at 359.
296. Id. at 359–60; see also infra section VI.C (discussing why a divorced wife could
not allege desertion and make entry).
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an opposite outcome was to be expected if a woman did not appear
innocent.
In one case, a new entryman challenged a deserted wife’s claim on
the grounds that she was not truly a deserted wife, but instead, “had
entered into a collusive scheme with her husband” to gain title.297 Al-
though the Secretary did not publicly decide whether the husband and
wife actually colluded, the Secretary held that the wife was unquali-
fied to make entry for failure to prove actual desertion.298 It appeared
the wife schemed to have her husband leave the homestead because
he was not a citizen and could not gain title to the land. Because the
Secretary likely believed (but did not officially state) that the couple
colluded, the Secretary found that the wife was not deserted and could
not make entry. Accordingly, the Secretary barred the couple from
proving up the homestead.299
Fault was not supposed to determine whether a marital desertion
had occurred for purposes of homestead rights. Yet, fault frequently
became the determinative factor. A wife had no homestead rights un-
less deserted, and good faith was required to prove up a homestead.
Accordingly, the Secretary frequently discussed the good faith of the
spouses in their marital relationship in deciding homesteading rights
(even though marital good faith was technically irrelevant to the
homesteading rights). The confluence of a good faith requirement in
the homesteading laws and the general allocation of fault in dissolving
marriages created a subtext of allocation of fault in the deserted wife
cases. At times, the guilt or innocence of a spouse led the Secretary to
bend the governing legal rules to ensure that an innocent spouse re-
ceived the homestead rights. The intersection of fault between mar-
riage law and land-grant law shows the special confluence of these two
areas—land rights were tied up in marital law and assumptions about
how married men and women should interact. At the same time, using
fault determinations allowed the Land Department to give home-
steading rights to deserted wives without it appearing as an act of
illegitimate redistribution. The use of fault in determining rights can
be understood as a corrective action—the government put the wife
back into the position where she would have been absent the miscon-
duct of the husband.
C. Privatizing Dependency
During the profiled timeframe, a husband’s desertion of a wife and
children was considered a social ill in most of America.300 In part this
297. Porter, 5 Pub. Lands Dec. 42, 42 (1886).
298. Id. at 43.
299. Id.
300. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. BALDWIN, FAMILY DESERTION AND NON-SUPPORT LAW 5
(1904) (explaining purpose of collecting and studying state laws was to come up
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was because, during the nineteenth century, “marriage was consid-
ered a ‘necessity’” for much of society and desertions led to the break-
down of marriages.301 More important even than the protection of
marriage was societal concern about public support for deserted wives
and children.302 Husbands were expected, and required by law, to
support their wives and children.303 A focus on the support obligations
of a husband is relevant in two ways. First, the hallmark in determin-
ing whether there was a desertion tended to be based on a husband’s
intent to provide continuing support. Second, desertion in the home-
steading context was unique because a deserting husband could leave
a wife in a better economic position.
During the homesteading period, husbands and wives frequently
lived apart.304 Not every instance of living apart qualified as a marital
desertion, and the Department of the Interior had to decide on a case-
by-case basis whether a husband had deserted a wife and abandoned
his homestead. Most often, the determinative factor was whether the
absent husband either provided support in his absence or intended to
do so after his return. A husband absent for a month could be a desert-
ing husband if he sent no support,305 but a husband absent for six
years was not necessarily a deserting husband so long as he provided
support on his return.306 Sending money during an absence could
with a solution to problems arising from “family desertion and non-support of
family” in Washington, D.C.); BRANDT, supra note 10, at 8–9 (discussing the con-
tributions made by groups in various communities in order to study and poten-
tially fix the social problem of deserting husbands).
301. Schwartzberg, supra note 16, at 299.
302. See, e.g., BALDWIN, supra note 300, at 10 (“Where the family has means of support
the absence of the husband is not a matter for public concern . . . . It is where the
family applies . . . for assistance . . . [that desertion] becomes a subject of interest
to the public.”); BRANDT, supra note 10, at 11 (arguing that the “public has no
concern” with deserting husbands so long as “the absence of the head of the fam-
ily does not mean destitution”); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 149–54 (dis-
cussing, generally, poor laws and social welfare from the American Revolution to
the middle of the nineteenth century). Notably, American policymakers also used
the enforcement of support obligations to assimilate immigrants into American
culture—by “making immigrant working-class men conform to American stan-
dards for marriage and the domestic environment”—in the early twentieth cen-
tury. COTT, supra note 16, at 169.
303. BALDWIN, supra note 300, at 59–132 (surveying the laws regulating marital sup-
port in the states and territories). A husband’s failure to provide that support was
seen as a “disregard of social obligations.” BRANDT, supra note 10, at 61; see also
COTT, supra note 16, at 169 (“The laws requiring husbands’ support . . . had con-
sequences in . . . marital roles” and “[t]he frequency of men’s desertion of their
wives and families became a public issue, as charitable societies addressed them-
selves to the needs of poor mothers and children.”).
304. HARTOG, supra note 7, at 20.
305. See, e.g., Pawley, 15 Pub. Lands Dec. 596, 596 (1892).
306. See, e.g., Thrasher, 8 Pub. Lands Dec. 626, 628–29 (1889). The evidence of intent
to continue support was the husband “convey[ing] to his wife all his interest in
the [homestead], and his subsequently joining her in a deed” transferring the
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guarantee a husband was not considered a deserter.307 However,
sending financial support did not guarantee a husband would be con-
sidered a non-deserter. One husband sent a total of twelve dollars dur-
ing his absence, but the Secretary found it was sent in bad faith only
so he could preserve his homestead right and that the wife had been
deserted regardless of the meager financial support.308 However, a
husband unable to provide any support—for example, if imprisoned—
was considered a deserter even though an absence from a homestead
due to imprisonment was generally excused for residency purposes.309
While desertion by a husband was generally considered a social ill
to be avoided because a wife might need public support, in the context
of homesteading a deserted wife could very well be better off finan-
cially after the desertion. The trajectory of the decisions involving de-
serted wives can be read as attempting to counteract the social
problems caused by deserting husbands and, thus, caused by mar-
riage. Once a husband had deserted his wife and homestead, if the law
considered his abandonment her abandonment,310 his wife was left
with few economic opportunities. But homesteading in her own name
gave a deserted wife the chance to be economically independent.311
During the homesteading period, settler women faced different eco-
nomic opportunities than most American women. Women living in the
American West engaged in various economic activities, including
traditional “women’s work” like teaching, sewing, cooking, and keep-
ing chickens for eggs. Female homesteaders who did not do their own
farming still used homesteads for financial support, for example, by
land to a third party. Id. at 629. These acts subsequent to his six-year absence
and return “seem to indicate good faith, and to show that he had not intended
leaving his family without making provision for their maintenance and support.”
Id.
307. See, e.g., Gates, 7 Pub. Lands Dec. 35, 35 (1888).
308. Kamanski, 9 Pub. Lands Dec. 186, 187 (1889).
309. See, e.g., Crosby, 21 Pub. Lands Dec. 152, 153 (1895). In Crosby v. Thompson, the
Department of the Interior stated: “It is very clear that Thompson has deserted
both his wife and the land.” Id. The facts of desertion were that “the husband
made entry of the land, and did some work thereon; but he appears soon after to
have been charged with the crime of larceny, was shot by the sheriff, and left the
State, his whereabouts not being certainly known, not even by his wife.” Id.
310. This was the initial rule governing the homesteading rights of deserted wives.
See supra section V.B (citing Vance v. Burbank, 101 U.S. 514, 521 (1879) and
Larsen, 1 Pub. Lands Dec. 401, 403 (1882)).
311. LINDGREN, supra note 14, at 73 (contrasting the inability of married women to
gain title to public lands against the ability of single and deserted women to gain
title to such lands); see also Karen V. Hansen, Land Taking at Spirit Lake: The
Competing and Converging Logics of Norwegian and Dakota Women, 1900–1930,
in NORWEGIAN AMERICAN WOMEN: MIGRATION, COMMUNITIES, AND IDENTITIES 207,
215 (Betty A. Bergland & Lori Ann Lahlum eds., 2011) (“Women homesteaded for
a range of reasons, but all sought the economic foothold that landowning
provided.”).
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renting the farmland.312 Accordingly, a tension developed whereby
administrative decisions had to “end” a marriage by declaring a deser-
tion in order to provide support for a deserted wife.
Without homesteading rights, it was difficult for a deserted wife to
support herself. Married women were unable to contract, making eco-
nomic activity exceedingly difficult.313 Women who had been deserted
but were still married continued to suffer from the disabilities associ-
ated with marriage but did not have the benefit of a present husband
to provide support. Across America, deserted wives were left to find
work or seek public assistance.314 Divorce brought the right to ali-
mony and support. Widowhood brought the right to dower or the elec-
tive share and the right to continued residence in the family home.315
Both death and divorce allowed remarriage. Desertion, however,
placed women in a “legal netherworld” where they suffered the disa-
bilities of marriage without any of the support benefits.316
Navigating this “legal netherworld” was not easy anywhere in
America. In the settled parts of America, particularly the eastern cit-
ies, deserted wives tended to seek employment if possible, and public
support if not.317 In order to provide for themselves and their chil-
dren, “women took in washing or went out to do day’s work, or they
did sewing at home, or kept boarders, or, rarely, found work in a shop
or factory.”318 Having the dual responsibilities of raising children and
earning wages tended to keep women, whether married or deserted,
from leaving home for work.319 In the American West, where the pri-
mary resource was land, a deserted wife would have been particularly
vulnerable if homesteading rights were unavailable. One goal of the
homesteading laws was to “provide families with homes upon the pub-
lic lands,” and the policy of allowing a deserted wife to retain posses-
sion and make entry after a husband deserted furthered that goal.320
Thus, a deserted wife could provide economic support for herself
through homesteading, but—because of the structure of the home-
steading laws—that right required a government declaration that she
was deserted. If a wife was not considered deserted—and thus was
312. See LINDGREN, supra note 14.
313. Margaret J. Chriss, Note, Troubling Degrees of Authority: The Continuing Pur-
suit of Unequal Marital Roles, 12 LAW & INEQ. 225, 228 (1993) (noting that under
coverture “[m]arried women also lost the right to contract and to sue”).
314. BRANDT, supra note 10, at 45–48 (discussing how deserted wives economically
survived immediately after desertion).
315. The homestead right, in this instance, means the right for a widow to continue
living in the marital residence. See supra note 23.
316. HARTOG, supra note 7, at 29.
317. BRANDT, supra note 10, at 45–47.
318. Id. at 46.
319. Id. at 34 (dealing with married women still cohabitating with husbands); id. at 46
(dealing with deserted wives).
320. Michaelis v. Michaelis, 44 N.W. 1149, 1149 (Minn. 1890).
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prohibited from filing on the homestead—the right to prove up would
eventually expire and she would lose any interest in the land, includ-
ing the value of her improvements. The homestead belonged to the
government until proven up,321 and denying a wife the right to prove
up could turn her from an economically independent woman to an im-
poverished ward of the state. Theoretically, deserted wives were enti-
tled to support from their husbands.322 In reality, however, courts
were limited in their ability to collect that support obligation from a
husband, particularly before a divorce was granted.323 From the gov-
ernment’s perspective, then, allowing a deserted wife to homestead
and obtain patent to land could provide support for her and obviate
the need for government support or government intervention to force
support from the deserting husband.
Because deserted wives could homestead—and thus come to own
land in their own names—desertion did not raise the same concern of
public dependency in the homesteading context as it did in the rest of
America. Ariela Dubler argues that marriage—historically and to-
day—has been used as a tool to reduce female poverty.324 Yet, for de-
serted wives, it was their marriages that ensured poverty, and it was
the end of their marriages that allowed them to obtain land and poten-
tial economic self-sufficiency. Desertion was still a social ill, but it was
easier to remedy the negative effects in the West. The homesteading
laws provided public support for deserted wives in a way that went
against the general policy of protecting marriage but also worked to-
ward the important public policy of keeping deserted wives and chil-
dren off public support.
D. Protecting Marital Privacy
The law—in various ways—protects marriages from outside inter-
vention. In the context of the homesteading rights of deserted wives,
marital privacy was implicated in a number of ways. The main protec-
tion for marital privacy came from limiting who could allege desertion.
However, the entire system of allowing deserted wives to allege deser-
tion and make entry led to litigation between husbands and wives,
bringing private marital affairs into the public sphere. The early pro-
hibition on deserted wives claiming a husband’s homestead—in effect
from 1875 until 1877—was justified on the grounds that allowing a
deserted wife to make such a claim would interfere with the marital
321. WAPLES, supra note 12, at 925.
322. COTT, supra note 16, at 170.
323. Id.; see also BALDWIN, supra note 300, at 13–15 (discussing various ways states
tried to collect support from deserting husbands, including civil actions—ineffec-
tive because few deserters had land or property to seize—and criminal actions).
324. Dubler, supra note 18, at 1644–45.
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relationship.325 This is the exact type of rule that could be expected
under the marital privacy protections of the time, yet that rule only
lasted for two years.
The doctrine of marital privacy, born from coverture, has long pro-
tected intact marriages from outside interference, either from the
courts or from private individuals.326 During the period relevant to
this Article, “[f]or most purposes, a husband acted as a husband
within a private sphere, without need to explain or justify his conduct
by public standards,”327 and states courts “were hesitant to depart
from the public policy expectation that marriage should be protected
whenever possible.”328 But once the husband failed at an obligation—
whether the husband failed to offer adequate support or exhibited
“conjugal unkindness”329 or excessive drunkenness330—the courts
would become involved in the marriage, and the husband “became vul-
nerable to the discretionary judgments of public officials, including
judges.”331 And once the legal system was involved, a husband, who
generally represented his wife in residency, legal action, and contract,
could lose that right of representation.332
Congress, in an effort to ensure good-faith compliance with the
homestead laws, allowed individual citizens to contest the homestead-
ing rights of others. Earning the right to make entry on the land as a
reward for securing the cancellation of another’s entry incentivized in-
dividuals to contest.333 Once a contest was filed, evidence was col-
lected, a hearing was held, and a right to appeal attached.334 This
system, of course, lead to public interventions into the private affairs
of any challenged homesteaders—including married couples. In the
325. Mrs. Keziah Card, supra note 97, at 51 (setting forth the Commissioner’s holding
that deserted wives could not challenge a husband’s entry because allowing such
challenge would be “in violation of the fundamental principles governing the rela-
tion of husband and wife”).
326. For a short discussion of how the meaning of marital privacy has changed over
time in America, see Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
1087, 1132–35 (2002).
327. HARTOG, supra note 7, at 164.
328. John, supra note 50, at 158.
329. HARTOG, supra note 7, at 164.
330. John, supra note 50, at 142.
331. HARTOG, supra note 7, at 164; see also Hartog, supra note 83, at 226 (“From an
early time before the creation of the United States, local governments had in-
truded whenever a husband refused to support wife and children on the theory
that he was thereby making his dependents into public charges.”).
332. HARTOG, supra note 7, at 164.
333. See Pierce, supra note 25, at 283 (citing Act of May 14, 1880, ch. 89, § 2, 21 Stat.
140, 141; Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 2, 26 Stat. 1095, 1096). The right to make
entry did not last forever. If a contestant was successful, he or she received a
thirty-day period in which his or her right to make entry was given preference
over any other potential entryman. Id.
334. Id. at 284.
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early years of the homesteading laws, a challenger might allege that a
married homesteader deserted his wife and abandoned the home-
stead. This strategy made sense when a husband’s abandonment was
considered a wife’s abandonment and the homestead was available for
reentry by a new settler.335 But, in the landmark case of Bray v.
Colby, the Department of the Interior declared that only the wife of a
homesteader could allege his desertion.336 This rule, widely applied in
later cases,337 protected the rights of husbands and wives and pro-
tected marriage as an institution. Because only a wife could allege the
desertion of her husband, any outside potential challenger was prohib-
ited from alleging the dissolution of a marriage. In this way, the home-
stead laws worked in tandem with state laws to protect the integrity
of the marital unit.
The rule from Bray v. Colby—that only a wife could allege the de-
sertion of her former husband338—was also interpreted to prohibit a
divorced wife from alleging her former husband had abandoned the
homestead during or after the marriage.339 A divorce turned a mar-
ried woman into a “feme sole,” and once divorced “her rights as con-
testant [to her husband’s claim] must rest upon the same ground as
that of any other contestant, and can not be either enlarged or
abridged by reason of her former marital relation.”340 Accordingly, the
law prohibited an ex-wife from alleging the homestead abandonment
of her ex-husband.341 Instead of divorcing and claiming a homestead
as a divorced woman, a woman might have wanted to assert her rights
as a deserted wife because that would have given her the opportunity
to claim her husband’s homestead. While divorced women could home-
stead, they had no right to their former husbands’ claims and had to
make entry on a pice of land like any other homesteader. In addition,
an ex-wife could not allege the abandonment of an ex-husband; how-
ever, the Department of the Interior failed to strictly follow this rule.
In the litigation between Hannah Sugden and James Himsworth—the
couple in Washington where incestuous rape sent James to the peni-
335. See Vance v. Burbank, 101 U.S. 514, 521 (1879) (laying out rule that the hus-
band’s “acts affecting the claim are her acts. His abandonment, her abandon-
ment. His neglect, her neglect”).
336. Bray, 2 Pub. Lands Dec. 78, 81 (1884).
337. See, e.g., Crosby, 21 Pub. Lands Dec. 152, 153 (1895) (“[N]o one but his wife shall
be heard to allege the desertion in proof of his change of residence or abandon-
ment during the period of seven years from date of the entry, provided that [the
wife] maintains a residence on the land.” (citing Bray, 2 Pub. Lands Dec. at 81
(1884))).
338. Bray, 2 Pub. Lands Dec. at 81.
339. Gates, 7 Pub. Lands Dec. 35, 38 (1888).
340. Id.
341. Id.
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tentiary and Hannah filed for divorce342—the Secretary allowed
Hannah to cancel her ex-husband’s entry and make entry on the
homestead under her own name. Rightfully, her claim should have
failed because she could not legally allege her ex-husband’s deser-
tion.343 The Secretary, clearly wanting to help Hannah obtain home-
steading rights, declared that Hannah “may be regarded as a deserted
wife” and allowed her to allege the desertion of her ex-husband.344
The administrative maneuvering here shows how much of a legal
netherworld existed for deserted wives. Women could manipulate the
legal system to gain property rights when land-grant or marital prop-
erty laws would not otherwise grant them property rights. Plus, the
underlying goal of coverture—supporting women in a time when they
could not financially support themselves—encouraged federal admin-
istrators to stretch the law in order to grant women more property
rights. In Hannah’s case, the Secretary moved her from the legal sta-
tus of divorced (where she had no claim to the land) to the legal status
of deserted (where she did have a claim to the land) in order to guar-
antee her support.
Although outsiders to the marriage were not allowed to allege de-
sertion, marital privacy was not completely protected. Bray v. Colby
prevented an outsider from alleging desertion, but if a wife alleged
desertion, an outsider was allowed to intervene and argue desertion
had not occurred.345 Once a non-desertion was alleged, a wife would
end up litigating the facts of her marriage against a third-party settler
wanting to make entry on the homestead. In addition, deserted wives
initiated claims against their husbands, and the Department of the
Interior adjudicated those marital disputes in a public forum, fre-
quently publishing details of the marital relationship. A number of the
cases cited in this Article involved husbands and wives litigating
against each other, both claiming the right to the same homestead.
The 1914 Act that liberalized the rights of deserted wives was passed
in part to decrease this litigation between spouses. As the Secretary
explained: “The intent of the act was to excuse the wife from necessity
of waging a contest against her husband and enabling her to make
final proof and get patent direct without expense and delay of a
contest.”346
342. See supra section VI.B (discussing facts of the case in depth and discussing the
case in the context of allocating fault).
343. See Gates, 7 Pub. Lands Dec. at 38.
344. Sugden, 22 Pub. Lands Dec. 356, 359 (1896).
345. Bray, 2 Pub. Lands Dec. 78, 81–82 (1884); see also, e.g., Porter, 5 Pub. Lands Dec.
42, 42–43 (1886) (adjudicating case between a deserted wife and a third party
who alleged wife was not deserted and was merely colluding with husband to
subvert the citizenship requirements).
346. Jennie P. Musser, 44 Pub. Lands Dec. 494, 495 (1915).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Deserted wives existed in a “legal netherworld”—suffering the lim-
itations of marriage without the benefits of support.347 Deserted wives
residing on their husbands’ homesteads faced even starker challenges
because the homestead belonged to the federal government unless and
until the husband or wife proved up.348 Accordingly, a deserted wife
had to take action to preserve her home; inaction in the face of deser-
tion would lead to dispossession of her land and home. These deserted
wives sought not only financial security but also household
stability.349
During the homesteading period, marriage was generally viewed
as a permanent relationship, and separation was a way for wives to
gain some legal rights while remaining married. In some contexts, be-
ing merely separated—as opposed to divorcing—may have been a way
for women to continue performing their traditional wifely role of ex-
changing submissive obedience for the benefits of marriage.350 But
with marital desertion—a type of marital separation—in the home-
steading context, a deserted wife was not acting submissively. In fact,
by taking legal action, a deserted wife gained the legal benefit of the
homestead right. To protect her own legal rights, a deserted wife had
to actively take steps to allege the desertion of her husband, and often
she had to litigate against her own husband or a third party to protect
those rights. The ideal outcome of a wife alleging desertion by her hus-
band was for that wife to gain, in her own name, the legal rights to
land her husband had previously settled. Separations with home-
steaders, then, neither supported traditional gender roles nor showed
the submissiveness of American wives. Although divorce could be seen
as a form of liberation for a wife, in the homesteading context divorce
took away a woman’s rights to the marital homestead. While a di-
vorced woman could make entry on a homestead as a feme sole, she
could neither assert her husband’s abandonment of the homestead nor
prove up the marital homestead.351 This led to the odd incidence
where desertion was better than divorce in terms of property rights.
Deserted wives asserting homesteading rights are unique in Amer-
ican law—unique compared to other deserted or separated wives in
America and unique compared to other male or female homesteaders.
The administrative law cases about deserted wives show a number of
tensions and observations that are unique to this particular litigation:
differences between land-grant laws and marital relation laws; unique
347. HARTOG, supra note 7, at 29.
348. WAPLES, supra note 12, at 925.
349. See John, supra note 50, at 166 (“The early temperance effort was motivated by
wives principally attempting to stabilize their households.”).
350. Schwartzberg, supra note 16, at 295 (discussing HARTOG, supra note 7).
351. Massie, 28 Pub. Lands Dec. 406, 407 (1899).
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conceptualizations of the marital relationship; the interactions and
overlaps between state and federal law; and how homesteading laws
perhaps provided support to women who no longer had a husband for
support. Common to all of these cases was that deserted wives were
willing to publicly litigate—either against third parties or even their
own husbands—to claim real property as their own.
